Daily Report

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Further on Visit by Czech Industry Minister

Berisha Discusses Relations

AU1412203993 Tirana ATA in English 0910 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] Tirana, December 14 (ATA) - Albanian President Sali Berisha expressed his pleasure for the visit to Albania of the Czech minister of industry and trade, Vladimir Dlouhy, the first high ranking government delegation after democratic developments in the two countries. He considered the visit as important in reviving the ancient relations existing between the two peoples and countries. Mr. Berisha pointed out that both Albania and the Czech Republic, as two countries on the road of reforms, have numerous possibilities of cooperation.

The two officials shared the same opinion that economic cooperation is [word indistinct] and mutually beneficial in fields like tourism, agriculture, mechanical and glass industries. Evaluating the development of reforms and privatization in the Czech Republic, President Berisha asked the Czech minister for a possible transfer of the Czech experience in the privatization of medium and large enterprises.

The Czech minister said that he was ready to welcome in his country Albanian experts as well as to bring in Albania Czech experts. The Czech Government appreciates the achievements of Albania in the market economy and supports its efforts in the promotion of the reforms.

President Berisha gave to Mr. Dlouhy an invitation for President Havel to visit Albania.

Meksi, Dlouhy Meet

AU1412204193 Tirana ATA in English 0915 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] Tirana, December 14 (ATA)—Premier Aleksander Meksi met with the Czech minister of industry and trade, Vladimir Dlouhy, on December 13.

Mr. Meksi and Mr. Dlouhy discussed possibilities of increasing the contacts between the two ministries, transfer of the Czech experience in the field of privatization, reactivation of organizational structures in the two ministries, display of exhibitions of goods in the two countries, regular information network in service of Albanian and Czech businessmen and other points.

The Czech minister expressed the commitment of his cabinet to study possible cooperation between Albanian and Czech enterprises and supplying Albanian industrial enterprises with spare parts.

During the meeting, they expressed the idea of realising a bilateral agreement for the protection and encouragement of investment between Albania and the Czech Republic. Regarding this, experts of the two countries will meet as soon as possible.

On the same day, the Czech minister of trade and industry, Mr. Dlouhy, met with the deputy prime minister, Bashkim Kopliku. They exchanged opinions on the economic reforms in Albania and the Czech Republic and stressed the need of exchanging experiences. Mr. Kopliku showed interest in the introduction of the Czech business in industry, trade, transport, tourism and other fields.

Mr. Kopliku and Mr. Dlouhy shared similar opinions regarding the encouragement of foreign investment and their role in the economic development.

Zhulali Receives Turkish Military Delegation

AU1512074193 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] In the framework of the agreement and cooperation in the field of defense between Albania and Turkey, a Turkish military delegation led by General Atil Ayshek [name as heard] arrived in our country today.

The delegation will participate in the meeting of the Joint Committee on programming relations for 1994.

The Turkish military delegation was received by Defense Minister Safet Zhulali. During the meeting, they exchanged opinions about fields of cooperation of mutual interest for both armies. They also exchanged opinions on the situation in the region.

Daily Criticizes Kalakula as 'Careerist'

AU1612090493 Tirana RILINDJA DEMOKRATIKE in Albanian 14 Dec 93 p 1

[Xhevat Mustafa article: "Is Mr. Kalakula's Position Surprising or Sincere?"]

[Text] For a large, consolidated, powerful, and truly democratic and modern party like the Democratic Party [PD], the departure of one or more elements who hastened to join its ranks out of narrowly personal and careerist ambitions, or who were pawns, causes no great surprise, serious concern, shocking alarm, or irreparable loss. First the motionists went, and the PD did not notice, and now Kalakula and Baleta have gone, and the PD will again not notice, just as a mountainside will not notice the slide of a few clods. More than a propaganda move against the PD, the withdrawal of Kalakula and Baleta from the PD parliamentary group is political and moral suicide, because they needed the PD to secure a deputy's mandate or an armchair. Now that they have achieved these things, they have shown different faces, demonstrating insincerity and treachery to the PD and the electorate that gave them their votes on 22 March [1992]. Of course, just as they were not sincere in the position they have abandoned, they will not be sincere in their position as "independents."

Verbally, Kalakula advertises himself as a rabid anticommunist who would not rest content if he saw every communist in a jam, from those guilty of crimes to the

innocent. But in his behavior in his family, in the ministry he directed, and elsewhere, he was meek as a lamb toward former communist cadres or their spawn to whom they awarded posts, because he was well aware of the skeleton in his own biography. Now can one become a prominent director in the capital city's agricultural sector and an assistant and close collaborator of Manush Myftiu, while having a political prisoner as a brother by the same mother and father? In order to gain posts and privileges at a time when his brother, the distinguished intellectual Uran Kalakula, was being tortured in prisons, Petrit denied and forgot his brother, while now, under democracy, in order to land other posts and privileges with a certificate of having been persecuted, he emerges as devoted to this brother, and embraces him like a drowning man clutching at the straw of his long persecution. However, can one trust a man who denied even his own brother, as emerges clearly from the facsimile published below?

[The following passage is published as a facsimile of a handwritten document, signed "Petrit Kalakula," dated 9 August 1971, and bearing the seal of the Cadre Department of a Tirana District Committee of the Albanian Workers Party.]

I have only my brother, Uran Kalakula, former teacher in the village of Sharre in Tirana District, who was sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment for hostile activities in 1961, and who is still in prison. We as a family were not on speaking terms with this brother for three years before he was convicted, because we quarreled after his marriage; nor have we had any relations with him since his conviction. We have condemned his activities. None of my other relatives has ever been sentenced by the people's courts. [end of facsimile]

What price did Petrit pay for his posts and quiet survival when the Enverist dictatorship was at its savage apogee, when thousands of families with similar skeletons in their biographies were interned and banished as far from Tirana as possible? One price was the denial of his blood relatives. But what else? Making denials his second nature, he has now denied the PD. In the final analysis, this also means a denial of himself, the fall of the Kalakula meteor and the overthrow of his pseudo cult. The PD raised him much higher and gave him much more than he deserved. However, as the saying goes, every cloud has a silver lining. A man who took more than he gave, and who hindered more than he helped, has deserted the bosom of the PD. Communist-socialist poets should write songs and sculptors raise a bust to Kalakula for the great service he rendered with his statement in parliament that he was "honored to be a fascist." For more than one month, ZERI I POPULLIT blackened its front pages with the dark shadow of fascism that was allegedly lurking under the PD banner. For this, ZERI I POPULLIT should pay Kalakula the highest fee ever granted in its 51 years of life, or give him a special citation, perhaps of the "bomb and flag," for the most effective contribution to the struggle against the PD during 1993.

Kalakula's bogus anticommunism is also evident in his covert or overt support with his signature or by direct or indirect interventions in favor of the best possible survival of the spawn of high-level communist cadres, in order to enrich them or to turn them into proprietors, or to rescue people from the just punishment of the law. Of course, these people have not forgotten his kindnesses or their obligation to reward him.

Now, the rabid "anticommunist" Kalakula requires the protection and support of all the batteries of the communist-socialist propaganda artillery, ZERI I POPULLIT and its sisters, which bombarded him mercilessly for more than two years, and are now very vocal in his defense. Of course, this is understandable. At the moment, the Kalakula card and his step count for a great deal. Thus, after his verbal service and his "historic" statement, Kalakula has moved into the phase of service, loyalty, and devotion through deeds, by attacking the PD precisely now, when the opposition and the extreme left or Enverist leadership has greater need than ever.

Croatia's Granic on 'Very Successful Visit'

AU1612081493 Sofia BTA in English 1948 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Report by Evgeniya Drumeva]

[Text] Sofia, December 15 (BTA)—"In the shared assessment, this was a very successful visit," said Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia Mate Granic at the end of his official visit here. He discussed the development of bilateral relations and the situation in the Balkans at talks with Bulgarian Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov today. Mr. Daskalov and Mr. Granic signed a protocol on cooperation between the two countries' foreign ministries. This afternoon the chief Croatian diplomat was received, separately and in this order, by National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov, President Zhelyu Zhelev and Prime Minister Lyuben Berov.

"We respect the positions of Bulgaria which seeks good relations with all its neighbours and, on the other hand, respect for international standards. We, too, would like minority problems to be solved by international standards and by peaceful means rather than by war and ethnic cleansing, which creates the risk of a spill-over of the conflict from Bosnia-Herzegovina southwards," Mr. Granic told a news conference at the end of his visit here. Asked about the role of Turkey and Greece in the Yugo-conflict he said that according to Croatia, Turkey has so far played a positive role with respect to Bosnia-Herzegovina because it has suggested a peaceful settlement instead of confrontation between Muslims and Croats. "Greece makes no secret of being a good friend of Serbia and we have nothing against this. We would like them (the Greeks) to use their influence so that Serbia would comply with the international standards, which means that the problems of the Serbian ethnic community in the Republic of Croatia should be decided by the international standards which Croatia accepts and under international control, that (Serbia) should recognize Croatia within its internationally recognized borders so that relations between Serbia and Croatia could be normalized," Mr. Granic said, adding: "This is our message to Greece."

Asked how the Republic of Croatia would react in the event of an aggression against the Republic of Macedonia, Mr. Granic said that Croatia would react in the same way as to aggression against any sovereign state.

"I was pleased to hear that the Bulgarian position on the situation in the Balkans is commended exceedingly highly as a constructive position which leads to guaranteed peace and security in the region," National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov said after conferring with the Croatian foreign minister. Mr. Granic told Mr. Yordanov that Croatia appreciates Bulgaria's policy on the observance of sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro and that the Republic of Croatia uses its foreign policy contacts to support Bulgaria's request for compensation of the Yugo-embargo losses.

Mr. Granic was also appreciative of the Bulgarian position on regional problems when he conferred with President Zhelyu Zhelev. According to the presidential spokesman, Dr. Zhelev emphasized that Bulgaria favours a promotion of its relations with all Balkan countries and that nothing it has been doing on a bilateral plane has been directed against any third country. The sides stressed that there are no obstacles whatsoever to the progress of bilateral relations. The treaty of friendship and cooperation between Bulgaria and the Republic of Croatia will be signed after a date for an exchange of visits at head of state or government level is coordinated through diplomatic channels, the Bulgarian president's spokesman said. He also said that Bulgaria will soon have an ambassador in Zagreb.

At the meeting between the Croatian Foreign Minister and Bulgarian Prime Minister Lyuben Berov, the sides noted the shared desire of Bulgaria and Croatia for integration into the European structures and exchanged views on the risk of the Yugo-conflict spilling southward, voicing concern over the possible consequences of such turn of events. It was pointed out that in addition to the bilateral treaty of friendship and cooperation, the two countries will draft agreements on the avoidance of double taxation and investment protection, a cultural agreement, a transport agreement, and agreements on cooperation between the Foreign Ministries and the Defence Ministries of Bulgaria and the Republic of Croatia.

Government, Sanctions Mission Sign Memorandum

AU1512165493 Sofia BTA in English 1551 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Sofia, December 15 (BTA)—The Bulgarian Government signed a memorandum of understanding with the sanctions assistance mission of the European Union [EU] and the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe which makes provisions for EU/CSCE customs experts' assistance in the enforcement of the UN Security Council sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro, BTA learned from the Foreign Ministry Press Office.

The document was signed by Deputy Foreign Minister Todor Churov on behalf of Bulgaria, and by the ambassadors of Italy and Belgium to Bulgaria on behalf of the EU and CSCE in their capacity as representatives of the countries holding the Presidency of the EU and CSCE at the moment.

The memorandum specifies the activity of the EU/CSCE mission aimed to assist the competent Bulgarian authorities in the implementation of the UN Security Council resolutions imposing trade and economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).

Similar memorandums have been signed with another six countries—Macedonia, Albania, Croatia, Hungary, Romania and Ukraine, which also host EU/CSCE customs expert missions.

Striking Miners Block Roads; Talks Continue

AU1612074693 Sofia BTA in English 2013 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Sofia, December 15 (BTA)—Thirty-five thousand mine workers are on strike, the president of the Podkrepa-affiliated Miners Federation Dimitur Dimov told a news conference today. The miners' effective strike, declared by Podkrepa, went into its third day today. The members of the Miners Federation affiliated to the other influential labour amalgamation, the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria (KNSB), ended their strike last Friday after reaching an agreement with the government. The two largest trade union amalgamations failed to agree on concerted actions and release conflicting figures on the number of strikers.

The Podkrepa striking miners today blocked for an hour the Sofia-Istanbul international road and the Munich-Istanbul railway at Dimitrovgrad. Another group of miners blocked for an hour the Sofia-Kyustendil-Gyushevo-Skopje international road. The road for Romania and Byala and the international road for Greece via Petrich were also blocked.

Other Podkrepa-affiliated federations are joining the miners' strike. The members of the Podkrepa Medical Federation also stopped work today. Protesting physicians refuse to perform scheduled surgery and to issue medical certificates.

All structures of Podkrepa's Mechanical Engineering Federation have joined the protest, taking token and, in some places, effective industrial action, the federations said.

The leaders of the Podkrepa Miners Federation started negotiations with Regional Development and Construction Minister Khristo Totev and Industry Minister Rumen Bikov at the Council of Ministers this evening. If the sides fail to reach agreement, international roads may be blocked all day tomorrow, Mr. Dimov said.

The KNSB miners who went on strike last week will receive a copy of the documents signed with the government, KNSB leader Krustyu Petkov told a news conference. Conferring with Industry Minister Rumen Bikov today, Prof. Petkov made sure that the money for the payment of miners' wages had been remitted. This was one of the principal demands of the strikers, who numbered 30,000 according to the KNSB and 1,500 according to Podkrepa. "The Podkrepa Labour Confederation is in a complete isolation, it made a mistake when it declined the KNSB's offer for miners' joint action, and now its miners' strike stands no chance at all," Prof. Petkov said.

Dogan Mediates Preliminary Talks

AU1612074493 Sofia Khorizont Radio Network in Bulgarian 2000 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] With the mediation of Ahmed Dogan, leader of the parliamentary group of the Movement for Rights and Freedoms, preliminary talks took place late this evening between Podkrepa President Dr. Konstantin Trenchev and representatives of the strike committees of the Miners and Doctors Federations affiliated to the Podkrepa Labor Confederation, on the one side, and Deputy Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev and Industry Minister Rumen Bikov on the other.

The government representatives received details of a proposal for a draft general agreement, together with the main claims for settling many problems, which is aimed at reducing the social tension that has arisen. It was agreed that Matinchev and Bikov would brief the government on these claims at tomorrow's session of the Council of Ministers.

After a ballot is taken to grant authorized representatives authority to hold negotiations, work will start on drafting the final text of the general agreement, with experts from the relevant government departments and Podkrepa taking part, the Council of Ministers Press Center reports.

Our reporter Varshava Maksimova reported that, according to Dr. Trenchev, the strike will still continue tomorrow, but that the Podkrepa representatives have confirmed the government's goodwill and its willingness to resolve the problems raised.

Deputy Prime Minister Matinchev has asked the structures of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation to refrain from civil disobedience.

Assembly Adopts New National Police Act

AU1612070693 Sofia BTA in English 2111 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Sofia, December 15 (BTA)—Today parliament adopted a National Police Act. The bill had been approved and introduced to the National Assembly by Council of Ministers decision of May 18, 1993.

A lot of factors made it necessary to adopt a new law on the National Police. The Police Act operating since 1976 was drawn up in an entirely different social and political situation—under the conditions of a totalitarian regime. A great part of the police powers provided for in the 1976 Act do not correspond to the international instruments guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of man and the instruments concerning crime control, the maintenance of public peace and citizens' safety and security, it is said in the statement of arguments for adopting the new law.

The basic principle in the new National Police Act is maintaining public peace and security by making it possible for all citizens to exercise their constitutional rights and freedoms, the Council of Ministers points out motivating the act. Particular attention is paid to the powers of the police directly concerning individuals' rights and freedoms, such as the use of special spying devices and techniques (until the adoption of a separate

act, their employment will be regulated by a special ordinance, which the interior minister and the prosecutor general are obliged to issue by December 31, 1993). The new act regulates persons' registration and arrest by the police, the right of the police to enter persons' premises, the use of force and arms by the police, the police force equipment and its use. Provisions are made for number of other aspects of the activity of the police force.

Under the act, the law enforcement units enjoy immunity when discharging their functions. An important component of the police force demilitarization is that any wrongful act committed by police employees is suable in a civil court and that convicted wrongdoers, sent to special establishments of imprisonment, will serve their sentences under special regime, the government stated on introducing the draft law.

The National Police Act was drawn up using the legal instruments relating to police forces enacted in the United States, Great Britain, Italy and France, as well as Bulgarian acts and ordinances.

Mikhaylov Denies Discrimination Against Arabs

AU1612094993 Sofia BTA in English 2147 GMT 15 Dec 93

["Arabs Are Not Discriminated by the Police, Bulgarian Interior Minister Says"—BTA headline]

[Text] Sofia, December 15 (BTA)—Under the Bulgarian law, the police may enter a person's home without a warrant by the Prosecuting Magistracy if a crime is reported and if the prosecutor is apprised of the actions of the police, Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov said in reply to a question by the anchorperson of the national television's Repercussions commentary programme this evening. This edition of Repercussions was devoted to the National Police Act adopted by parliament today. The anchorperson's question was prompted by the note of ten Arab ambassadors in Sofia presented in protest against "the danger to Arab citizens," recently created in Bulgaria.

The strain was caused by press publications on two incidents. Two months ago a taxi driver was killed by a Syrian citizen in Sofia and taxi drivers gathered for a protest rally in front of the Embassy of Syria. During a police checkup tracing drug traffickers earlier this month, some foreign nationals put up resistance killing one policeman and severely wounding another two and managed to run away. Later on two citizens of Iran were shot when the police tried to arrest them. As the police initially supposed that they were Arabs, commenting on the incident, the press referred to the foreign nationals as Arabs.

No Arab family, unrelated to the offenders wanted by the police, has ever been disturbed, Interior Minister Viktor Mikhaylov said. The police was checking the reports no matter whom they concerned—Bulgarians or foreigners. One of the persons concealing the runaways is Bulgaria, his connections have also been investigated, the minister said. He refused any further information because the case is still under investigation.

I am not prepared to say that the police have acted legally always and everywhere, but everybody who believe their rights have been violated can send a letter to me and I will order a checkup, the interior minister said. Nobody is interested in the police acting unlawfully, he added.

Mr. Mikhaylov said that he would probably meet Arab diplomats early next week to clarify the matter.

Matinchev Comments on 'Destabilization' Efforts

AU1412150093 Sofia KONTINENT in Bulgarian 3 Dec 93 p 3

[Interview with Deputy Prime Minister Evgeni Matinchev by Lyubomira Nikolaeva; place and date not given: "The President Is Trying To Score Points With the Union of Democratic Forces in a Preelection Atmosphere"]

[Text] [Nikolaeva] Mr. Matinchev, what is your comment on the claim for presidential rule recently voiced by Dr. Zhelev?

[Matinchev] He is proposing something which does not exist in the Bulgarian Constitution, something which has provoked the strong objection of the parliamentary groups. It is a totally unjustified request which should neither be submitted nor accepted.

[Nikolaeva] The president reportedly referred to the difficulties of the transition period under which the president's extended rights could overcome the stagnation of the reform....

[Matinchev] This is possible only within the framework of the constitution and on the basis of a National Assembly decision. One cannot ask for extended prerogatives which are not even mentioned in the constitution.

[Nikolaeva] Dr. Zhelev also admits the possibility of a cabinet reshuffle. Was his statement preceded by critical remarks against some ministers?

[Matinchev] No, so far I have not heard about the president submitting similar views on the government's work to Prof. Berov. There have been no requests for specific personnel changes either. The cabinet is ready to examine any such proposals submitted by the parliamentary majority which is supporting the government, because objections against individual cabinet members on the part of the opposition are understandable and easy to explain.

[Nikolaeva] Could you be more specific?

[Matinchev] The whole tactics are aimed at early elections. The cabinet must fall, which means that all attacks

likely to help in overthrowing the government are considered appropriate. Hence, the attacks of the opposition are understandable. It is a part of political strategy to provoke social discontent likely to speed up the fall of the cabinet.

[Nikolaeva] Do you suspect a plot against the government?

[Matinchev] No, the aforementioned actions are simply attempts at destabilization in a crucial moment. Everyone realizes that our cabinet is trying to resolve the problems and is about to achieve its goal. The tactic of sabotaging parliament's work was successful. We watched how the bill on "bad" credits which should have been examined in September 1993 is being discussed as late as now, and this is only one example. Specific interests are also behind the trade unions' demands which merely serve as a cover.

[Nikolaeva] Which interests are concealed behind the president's recent statement, according to you?

[Matinchev] I would say that it is the tribute he pays to certain political forces, to some extent. In talking about elections, we should not forget that presidential elections are also expected to take place sooner or later.

[Nikolaeva] Do you suspect the president of trying to score points of sympathy with the Union of Democratic Forces [SDS]?

[Matinchev] Of course, or to put it more precisely, he is trying to score points with the SDS, among others.

[Nikolaeva] Which are the other forces whose support he is trying to win?

[Matinchev] The others are a mixture of all those on whom the president has so far relied in connection with promoting the implementation of specific tasks related to the government's work. The president has managed to stabilize the conditions for the implementation of the government program throughout 1993. However, once the solutions of all difficult problems are under way, the political forces and leaders consider that the time has come for them to take over the power, after all the necessary work has been accomplished. The tactic is transparent. Someone should stand at the head of the government and gain a political bridgehead before the elections.

[Nikolaeva] Perhaps it is just a request for some cabinet members' "heads" to be sacrificed?

[Matinchev] No, this is not the purpose of the strategy. The government team has drafted the budget, but its implementation requires a new approach. Each cabinet member should say whether he is in a position of promoting the necessary policy in his specific field under the current parameters of the budget. The claims exceeded the budget by billions of leva. The question is posed as follows: Who is capable of accomplishing the tasks of his specific field of work under the current conditions, and who is not able to do so? Henceforth, each cabinet minister must show whether he has the strength, the possibility, and the capability of working under such conditions.

[Nikolaeva] Can you give us an example?

[Matinchev] Let us take the health care sector, for example. Yes, it is true that there are great problems involved, but it is a fact that no medical doctors have been dismissed from their work. Privatization is proceeding under the most unscrupulous form in that sector. Medical instruments and medicines are disappearing as soon as they have been delivered. Should we tolerate such a situation? Should we support a full medical staff in health establishments which are working at 35 percent of their capacity?

[Nikolaeva] Are you saying that....

[Matinchev] It is evident that a reorganization is called for. A drastic improvement in the style and methods of health care administration is required. The question is—is the minister capable of complying with such requests or not?

[Nikolaeva] The minister of defense said that a state without money does not need a defense minister.

[Matinchev] I am ready to discuss even the problems in the Army, one by one. Has the military service been reduced? It has been reduced, indeed. What kind of Bulgarian Army is this in which there is one officer for every two and a half soldiers? Show me another normal state with so many army officers! It is evident that the question of retirement should be radically resolved. I am talking about thousands of officers. It is obvious that expenditures should be adjusted to the reduced term of military service and it is evident that Bulgaria's possibilities in the defense sector should be reassessed on the basis of the new military doctrine. Our country should not be a fenceless backyard, but nevertheless, nothing has changed about the concept of our country being the bastion of another large military bloc. We need new people and new ideas. Is this not precisely the reason why we took over the government? We should use the intellectual potential of the entire nation, rather than a mere 30-25 percent of it.

[Nikolaeva] Do you know any other cabinet members who are not ready to adjust to the new budgetary conditions?

[Matinchev] It depends on their own decision, but also on how their hitherto accomplished work is being assessed. We perfectly realize that once we have adopted a program, we should also account for our accomplished tasks. The prime minister is expected to submit the report in question to the National Assembly. We realize that, once the budget has been adopted, every cabinet minister should draft his own new policy enabling him to

cope with the granted resources. We are not a party-affiliated government, but we have the support of a certain majority and we shall comply with its evaluations.

[Nikolaeva] Under such circumstances, would you say that the four ministers of whom the Bulgarian Socialist Party [BSP] does not approve, are on their way out?

[Matinchev] Not until the moment in which we have sat down at the negotiating table and heard both sides.

[Nikolaeva] When is this expected to happen?

[Matinchev] Let us first create the appropriate atmosphere for adopting the budget. On the other hand, the talks could be conducted along with the parliament debates.

[Nikolaeva] Is it likely that the finance minister might be replaced?

[Matinchev] It is very easy to personalize the matter and put all the blame on Stoyan Aleksandrov. In the final account, however, the finance minister is only standing at the exit of the economic system as a whole. It would be naive to put all the blame on him. If we should raise the question of the finance minister's responsibility, we should first discuss the responsibilities of those ministers who should have created the appropriate conditions in their own fields of work by collecting the uncollectable revenues.

[Nikolaeva] Whom do you mean?

[Matinchev] I mean the cabinet members in charge of industry, power engineering, trade, and transport. There might be some shortcomings involving the Ministry of Finance itself, but it is not decent to assume that Minister Aleksandrov is the only one to blame.

[Nikolaeva] Only the other day the cabinet accused Dr. Trenchev [leader of the Podkrepa Labor Confederation] of trade unionist dictatorship [vozhdizum], while Podkrepa is making no secret of its ambitions to overthrow the government. Is a nationwide strike possible?

[Matinchev] Podkrepa could try to organize such a strike. However, I am convinced that the government cannot be overthrown. If Trenchev imagines such things and if he relies on the government's timidity, he is mistaken. He should be clearly told so. We shall discuss only trade union problems with the trade unions. As far as their opinion on who should be in charge of the macro strategy is concerned, it is certainly not their problem.

[Nikolaeva] In saying "they," do you mean the Confederation of Independent Trade Unions in Bulgaria [KNSB] and Podkrepa?

[Matinchev] Yes, indeed. They should finally understand that the resolutions of the Tripartite Council for Social Cooperation cannot be regarded as legal acts. Those decisions are of a mere consultative nature, while the government alone is authorized to take the final decision on the problems discussed.

Assembly's Slatinski on Conflict With Dimitrov

AU1412074593 Sofia 24 CHASA in Bulgarian 7 Dec 93 p 8

[Article by Nikolay Slatinski, chairman of the National Assembly's National Security Commission and deputy of the Union of Democratic Forces: "On Normal Politicians"]

[Text] The campaign that Filip Dimitrov and his cronies have been waging against me for the last eight months seems at first sight to be my own personal problem.

However, there is no way they will make me climb down so as to hold on to my parliamentary seat. I am absolutely firm in my motives for continuing to wage this fight—today, for tomorrow will certainly be far too late.

This is a fight for the dignity of Bulgaria, for it to be ruled by politicians who love their country more than themselves, who place national interests first, and who do not gaze on Bulgaria from the Eiffel Tower, Cologne Cathedral, or the Capitoline Hill, and do not use various embassies and secret services to pull strings.

This is a fight for the right of normal people to engage in politics. I mean people who are able to create, to love the opposite sex, and respect the views of a thinking opponent, and not to deny his right to exist. I mean people who do not suffer from complexes or psychological illnesses, who are not sexually disoriented, who are not abstract democrats, not cosmopolitans without kith or kin, not egoists, not full of complexes, and not guided by hatred.

This is a fight against deals behind the scenes; against decisions made by apparatchiks, with a lunge with a dagger; against expelling people without hearing the arguments of the persons expelled. It is a fight for common sense and against hysterics in politics.

This is a fight of politicians who have seen the light, who are ready to seek compromises in the name of the state's survival, in the name of turning our country into a force in the region, in the name of the 12 million Bulgarians now living within Bulgaria's present borders or scattered around the world, and in the name of all those who have, or think they have, an ethnic self-consciousness—Bulgarian citizens who find protection in our motherland.

If this settling of political accounts with me succeeds, I will be punished not for working against the interests of the SDS [Union of Democratic Forces], but for consistently defending these interests. So far, no one has been expelled from the SDS who—at the same time—has never betrayed the SDS; who has never, in a thousand votes, opposed the SDS position; who has not become

involved in scandalous affairs, who has not made insinuations about secret personal files, and who has not called his colleagues a bunch of idiots.

I will be punished for my conviction that corruption has no political color, and that my attitude to this crime cannot be dictated by the political affiliations of the person committing it.

The trouble with Bulgaria is that the changes have thrown up charming individuals, undoubtedly with strong personalities, who integrate in themselves the efforts of the nation. The most serious legacy of communism lies precisely in the level of the present political elite, taken overall—individuals who are petty in their thoughts and aims, inadequate in relation to the real situation in the country and the country's real needs; individuals susceptible to temptations, inclined to obedience, ready to bend even before the pressure is applied, and taking part in the governing of the state in the same way as they have led their lives hitherto—with their weaknesses, with their slothfulness in some cases, although their responsibilities are already immeasurably greater.

To win the favor and praise of certain tired foreign politicians, they are ready to discredit their own state at international forums, to support any additional protocols, sometimes containing provisions with unforeseeable consequences for our national security, state unity, and territorial integrity.

The problem here does not lie so much in the personal dispute between Filip Dimitrov and Nikolay Slatinski. It lies in the positions adopted. Let them be revealed to the public, and let the public judge who is defending the SDS cause and how, who is serving national interests and how; let the public judge what attitude each of us holds toward Europe, the United States, and Russia; to the national idea, to the religious sects, to the military-industrial complex, and so on.

As regards Filip Dimitrov himself, he has not passed the test that separates great politicians from the average mediocre crowd, like—when to hit the mark, and when to step aside—like Thatcher, Genscher, or Mitsotakis. Now Filip and five or six of his personal retinue have decided to stay at the top at any price and to achieve this by any possible means. They even descend to outright slander, to tolerating gray mediocrity, to supporting the vile things I was called in the SDS "New Pernik newspaper" (ranging from the mild term "stinking substance" to "Quasimodo" and "Hitler"); to carrying out punitive actions in all the local SDS coordinating councils in Pernik district with a single aim—to have my head on a plate.

I have nothing against Filip Dimitrov as a man. Good luck to him. I hope he experiences the joys that I have had in this life and does not have to suffer the torments that I have had. However, I measure my position regarding him in relation to the interests of the country and the SDS. When I ask myself: Is F. Dimitrov enlarging the SDS electoral base? Does he inspire the confidence of the ordinary man, buried in difficulties? Does he attract the intellectual type, inclined to doubt everything? Has he overcome his egotism, which made him incapable of holding a dialogue with anyone, incapable of winning the support of the SDS and other anticommunist and democratic forces? Does he enhance the image of the SDS at home and abroad? To all these questions, I find that I must nevertheless answer "no." I have to answer: No, he cannot, because this is dangerous for the SDS idea itself and for the country's transition to democracy.

We now come to the final question: Is it worthwhile to wait for the day when the results of the inevitable elections become known, and only then come to our senses and realize our mistakes and their high cost to us?

I leave the answer to the reader.

For me at least, it is clear that the SDS urgently needs radical structural, organizational, ideological, and personnel changes (and democratic ones!)

Leaders Meet Council of Europe's Lalumiere

AU1412082893 Sofia BTA in English 2027 GMT 13 Dec 93

[Text] Sofia, December 13 (BTA)—Last night Bulgaria's Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov met Mrs. Catherine Lalumiere, secretary general of the Council of Europe, who arrived on a two-day friendly visit to Bulgaria yesterday. This is Mrs. Lalumiere's fourth visit to Bulgaria in the last four years.

The guest was familiarized with Bulgaria's political and economic situation and with its Yugoembargo-related difficulties. The embargo consequences have a negative impact on the political climate in the country and on the pace of democratic reform, it was stressed.

Mr. Daskalov and Mrs. Lalumiere also conversed about the initiatives Bulgaria is going to promote in the wake of its taking over the presidency of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers.

These initiatives should help the west better understand the problems of central and eastern Europe, it was pointed out at the meeting.

Prime Minister Lyuben Berov met Mrs. Catherine Lalumiere for a working breakfast. Familiarizing her with the economic and political situation in Bulgaria, Prof. Berov singled out the strong political confrontation as the most serious problem saying it was by no means helpful to the system's untroubled replacement, the government press office reported. The sides exchanged views on the development of conflicts in the territory of ex-Yugoslavia. Mrs. Lalumiere congratulated Prof. Berov and his ministers for their courage to govern the country at such a time of hardships, The Government Press Office said.

Later on Mrs. Lalumiere talked with National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov. Attention was focused on Bulgaria's wider integration into the European structures. Mr. Yordanov thanked Mrs. Lalumiere for her personal contribution to unblocking Bulgaria's interim trade agreement with the European Union, the Press Center of the National Assembly informed.

The Parliamentary Press Center said that Mrs. Lalumiere had described the slow pace of reforms and the government's modest successes in this field as a negative tendency. It seems that a non-party government cannot resolve all the problems, Mrs. Lalumiere is reported as saying. After all, a country is free to choose the path of reforms itself, she said. The Council of Europe attaches much importance to the democratization of societies in the East European countries - it is already a fact in Bulgaria, and to the economic progress of all members of the European organization, Mrs. Lalumiere is said as having pointed out.

A will to change the society, genuine democracy and ethnic peace—these are the positive trends in Bulgaria's development, the Parliamentary Press Center cited Mr. Yordanov as saying. The chairman of the National Assembly said that the complicated relations among the political forces in this country would lead to early general elections. In his opinion, Bulgaria suffers from an illness which has affected all the countries in Eastern Europe: the lack of stable parliamentary majority to assume responsibility for the adoption of legislation that is most essential for a country's transition from totalitarianism to democratic development.

Mrs. Lalumiere had a meeting with President Zhelyu Zhelev who thanked her for her personal commitment to the Bulgarian cause concerning the deblocking of the Bulgaria-EU interim trade agreement.

We made a review of the situation in this country and situation in the region, talked about the election in Russia and discussed Bulgaria's presidency of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers, which it is to take over early in May next year, Mrs. Catherine Lalumiere told a news conference this afternoon before her departure. In this way Mrs. Lalumiere summed up the meeting she had last night with Foreign Minister Stanislav Daskalov and today's talks with president Zhelyu Zhelev, Prime Minister Lyuben Berov and National Assembly Chairman Aleksandur Yordanov.

Mrs. Lalumiere emphasized that Bulgaria's presidency of the Council of Europe Committee of Ministers as symbolic and very important because the Committee of Ministers would be presided by an East European country or the first time so far. She expressed her satisfaction with Bulgaria's preparations in this respect adding that the initiatives which Bulgaria would launch were being specified at the moment.

Bulgaria can help Europe in understanding Russia and can serve as a bridge between Russia and Europe—Mrs. Lalumiere said recalling Bulgaria's centuries-old ties with Russia. She expressed her wish that Bulgaria play the role of a stabilizing factor in the Balkans, a region which she considers to have always been unstable and full of conflicts.

I am pleased to welcome Bulgaria's integration with the Council of Europe's information network, Mrs. Lalumiere said in inaugurating the Council of Europe Information and File Center in Sofia in the presence of Dr. Zhelev. Early this morning Mrs. Lalumiere opened the International Conference on equality of the sexes in the period of transition in the Central sand East European countries, organized by the Bulgarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Council of Europe. President Zhelev attended the opening of the conference.

Foreign Ministry Statement on Russian Elections

AU1512193993 Prague CTK in English 1546 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 15 (CTK)— The Czech Foreign Ministry today welcomed the first free and democratic elections in Russia, which were held on Sunday, but warned against the large support given to extremist forces.

"These results show that the process of overcoming the past and the road towards stable democracy will be long and complex," says a statement given to CTK by the ministry's spokeswoman, Lucie Pilipova.

The ministry "believes that the reform process in Russia will not stop, but will continue, and that neo-imperial forces that could threaten security and stability in Europe will not prevail in Russia's political life," the statement points out.

The ministry "is convinced that the complex developments in the Russian Federation only legitimize the Czech Government's effort at the Czech Republic's fully-fledged integration into Western security structures," the statement stresses.

Vote Legitimizes NATO Aspirations

AU1512193893 Prague CTK in English 1225 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 15 (CTK)— The high number of votes that an extreme right party appears to have gained in the Russian elections is ominous, the spokeswoman for the Czech Foreign Ministry Lucie Pilipova said at a press conference today.

"The (provisional) results show that overcoming the past and Russian society's road to stable democracy will be long and hard," she said. But at the same time she praised the fact the elections had been free for the first time in Russia's history.

The provisional results show that the ultra-nationalist Liberal Democratic Party led by Vladimir Zhirinovskiy has won the most votes.

Pilipova expressed the conviction that the reform process would not come to a halt but continue, and that "neo-imperialist" forces would not gain the upper hand in Russian politics and threaten the security and stability of Europe. She added that the recent developments only served to further legitimize Czech efforts for fully fledged NATO membership.

Klaus Stresses 'Careful' Policy Toward Russia

LD1512214993 Prague Radiozurnal Radio Network in Czech 1700 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] The government deems it premature to draw conclusions from the Russian elections until the final results are known. This was said by Premier Vaclav Klaus following the Czech Government's meeting today. Marie Ruzickova has more details from the meeting:.

[Ruzickova] Proceeding from a foreign minister's report, the government described the long-term trend as being worse than mere statements made by the probable victor in the Russian election.

[Begin Klaus recording] We regard this trend as being logical. This is because the failure of the reforms that are being carried out has necessarily led to this outcome, and for us this is really a reason for the pursuit of a very careful policy toward that part of the world. [end recording]

[Ruzickova] The agenda of today's meeting of the government also included a further debate on the reform of state administration. According to the premier, it is very difficult to enumerate the financial costs connected with state administration as well as the trend in the number of employees in the state apparatus. According to the premier, the position of government members is coming closer together and it is necessary first of all to answer the question of what will be the relationship between a citizen and the state administration, and only then to answer the question of what proportions there will be between the state administration and self-administration.

The government then approved a draft amendment to the existing law on pension insurance which is to come into force in 1995 and which in the final analysis will entail considerable differentials between pensions. The government also decided to extend to 30 June next year the date by which Slovak citizens can apply for citizenship of the Czech Republic.

Long-Term Trend 'More Important'

AU1612081193 Prague CTK in English 1747 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 15 (CTK)— The long-term trend is much worse and more important for the Czech Republic than pre-election statements made by a politician, Premier Vaclav Klaus said after the Czech Government's session today.

Reacting to Sunday's elections in Russia, Klaus said that it was premature to draw definitive conclusions from preliminary results and also the election system in Russia had to be taken into consideration.

"The final results will be somewhat different from the thus far published ones," he pointed out. "The results are necessarily due to the unsuccessful reforms and we must be watching carefully the developments in that part of the world," Klaus said.

Commentary on 'Alarming Signal' From Russia

AU1612131693 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 15 Dec 93 p 9

[Pavel Posusta commentary: "An Alarming Signal Is Resounding From Moscow"]

[Text] Moscow has sent the world a consequential and alarming signal. The man who in 1992 dispatched Russian volunteers to Iraq to indicate his support for Saddam's regime is dominating the electoral rankings with his party in 77 out of the 88 regions. He is Vladimir Zhirinovskiy, the leader of the ultra right-wing Liberal Democratic Party.

Russia is thus becoming even more inscrutable, mainly to its immediate neighbors, among whom we have to count ourselves, even though we do not have a common border.

No doubt, we should be grateful that the Russians approved a new constitution in a referendum a constitution giving huge powers to President Yeltsin and few to parliament, where Zhirinovskiy's super- nationalists will take their seats alongside the communists and the pro-reform forces. Zhirinovskiy's ambitions will certainly not end here, however.

The constitution tailored by Yeltsin to suit himself may, in the next presidential elections, turn against Russia and the ongoing reforms. This turnabout—dangerous for the world and for Central and Eastern Europe in particular—is represented by the very electoral success of the phenomenon called Zhirinovskiy. It is enough to look back on some of his election slogans: To halt the conversion of the Russian arms industry and support arms exports, not to make the repayments on the foreign debt, to unite the former Soviet republics in a new Greater Russia, to slow the withdrawal of Russian units from Eastern Europe, the Baltic states, and the former Soviet republics, and to radically settle accounts with crime. His promises are crowned by the statement he made in October to ultra right-wing Germans in Passau in Bavaria—"Germany and Russia should again have a common border."

Russia is still the largest nuclear power in Europe and has a huge arsenal of equally dangerous conventional weapons. No matter what Zhirinovskiy meant by his Passau statement, it could mean an unimaginable threat to move the current borders and—obviously—by military force. His Greater Russian ultra-nationalism will definitely not receive a hearing either in Kiev, which is the third largest possessor of nuclear weapons in the world, or in the Baltic states, or in Warsaw. Nationalism by one side logically spawns nationalism on the other side. This is manifested in Bosnia every day.

The fact that Zhirinovskiy has not only the people, disappointed by the slow economic reforms, to thank for his electoral success, but also the officers and soldiers, with whom he ingratiates himself by his image of an imperial Russia, is even more dangerous.

The countries of Central and Eastern Europe thus find themselves in an alarming security vacuum. There is only one functional and functioning security structure on the continent—NATO. However... NATO, goaded by Yeltsin and the endeavor not to irritate and isolate Russia, previously adopted a reserved attitude toward the attempt to incorporate the post-communist countries under its protective umbrella. The U.S. proposal, Partnership for Peace, which offered the gradual involvement of Europe's East in NATO by a form of joint exercises and coordination, appeared to be a way out of this impasse—to refuse or not to refuse membership. The issue is whether this plan—reckoning with Russia as a reformist and democratic European country—would still be functional if Yeltsin is up against the black-red coalition of Zhirinovskiy and the communist bloc. Obviously, not.

Uncertainty imported from Moscow is hovering over Central and Eastern Europe, just as it is over the fate of Russia itself and the former Soviet republics. The best policy is to reckon with the worst possible option. After all, the success of each policy is measured by the catastrophes that do not occur. And Zhirinovskiy with presidential powers would be a catastrophe.

We cannot merely take succor in the hope that, sooner or later, the Russian voters will realize the kind of man they have given so many votes to. Admittedly, the Berlin Wall has come down, but we are no safer. In this situation, Brussels should have another think about whether it wants to have Central and East Europe as its buffer zone against Moscow or whether it really considers us to be partners worthy of protection and of playing our part in joint security.

Intelligence Report Analyzes NATO Expansion

AU1412184093 Prague CESKY DENIK in Czech 11 Dec 93 p 10

[Item "prepared by" Petruska Sustrova: "Russian Intelligence Is Studying and Analyzing the Expansion of the North Atlantic Pact"]

[Text] The potential expansion of NATO's sphere of responsibility into Central and Eastern Europe (SVE) is one of the key issues for determining the future form of European security and the deployment of forces on the continent in the post-communist era. The SVE states' shift toward NATO affects Russia's interests and merits careful analysis. Russian intelligence has drawn up a comprehensive document on this subject. CESKY DENIK now publishes its second part, called "Russia's Interests."

From the point of view of Russia's interests, NATO's expansion has several aspects that it is essential to take into consideration in the process involving the development of its relations with the North Atlantic Pact,

Central and Eastern Europe, and the adjacent countries ("adjacent countries" is the term for the states on the territory of the former USSR—Translator's note).

NATO's Prospects

In the opinion of Russian intelligence experts, an analysis of the impact of NATO's expansion on Russia's interests—first and foremost, prognoses for the Alliance's possible development following the end of the Cold War—is warranted. The declared aims and political momentum conditioned by the actual situation affirm that the Pact should transform itself from a military- political grouping oriented toward warding off external threats into an instrument for guaranteeing peace and stability based on the principle of collective security. The task of expanding NATO's sphere of responsibility toward the East is perceived in this context. At the same time, according to the Russian intelligence experts, Russia's many anxieties concerning the entry of the SVE countries into NATO would be eradicated or diminished if there were guarantees that either the process of modifying the Alliance's tasks would precede their entry or that NATO's political functions and geographical scale would—simultaneously—be expanded. However, there are no such guarantees.

First and foremost, the issue of prospects for NATO's transformation is not sufficiently clear. So far, no precise concept has been formulated within the Pact on its role and involvement in the system of international relations in the post-communist era. The discussions about NATO's political strategy are more of a preliminary and evaluative nature. At the same time, it is obvious that the Atlantic partners have different views on the attitude toward the tasks and jurisdiction within NATO's sphere of security and on the attitude other international institutions have toward them. The stereotypes of "bloc" thinking also persist, something that is intrinsic to a number of representatives of the Western countries' military leaderships and to the Alliance as a whole. One of these stereotypes is that the USSR—whose core was formed by Russia—was regarded for years as the main source of the military threat to the very existence of Western civilization. As a consequence of its mentality, NATO is strategically oriented "toward the worst possible variant," which is reflected in the nature and details of its operative documents, its military structure, and the military preparation of the national and coalition armed forces. Eliminating these "anachronisms" will, obviously, take more time. The psychological breakthrough also cannot occur painlessly and will meet with resistance from influential representatives of ruling circles, the military establishment, the academic world, and the NATO states' military-industrial complex.

It is impossible to expect inertia and a reduction in the intensity of the arms race, which requires that an "image of the enemy"—albeit a potential one—be maintained in society's consciousness. This is also supported by the alarm expressed by representatives of leading NATO countries about a possible reduction in the roles of the economy and science in the military sector. Anxiety is not infrequently expressed in the West concerning the loss of economic resources and of the technological level achieved in the event of the decline of the military-industrial complex under the conditions of "post-confrontational euphoria."

The endeavor by the SVE countries—by means of their entry into NATO—to prompt the West to collaborate actively in resolving their domestic political and foreign problems may bring an unexpected result. The North Atlantic Pact—drawn into the complicated processes underscored by the bitter struggle in the East European countries—may be faced with the objective necessity of proceeding in its policy with greater severity. NATO's transformation into a universal peace-making and stabilizing force may become protracted. In any event, there is a danger that this process will not be chronologically in harmony with the Alliance's expansion. This creates a danger for the interests of the Russian Federation, because such temporal disparity could reduce the chances of definitively brining an end to the division of the continent and could lead to the return of a "bloc" policy, and this in a situation when the zone of NATO's responsibility is in the immediate proximity of the Russian Federation's borders.

The Geopolitical Aspects

The advocates of the SVE countries joining NATO understand that moving the zone of responsibility towards the Russian border evokes certain anxiety in the Russian Federation, and in an attempt to take off the edge of this reaction, they use the following arguments:

—the sphere of international stability guaranteed by NATO will apply to countries bordering directly on the territory of the former USSR; hence, the North Atlantic Alliance will assume the responsibility for the peace and prevention of conflicts in this region;

—if NATO decides on numeral expansion of its membership, it will be forced to assume a clearer stand regarding the fundamental questions of the transformation of Europe during the post-Cold War period, define without any ambiguity the objectives and form of its future cooperation with the Russian Federation and other CIS members, accelerate the process of the reassessment of the political role of NATO, and adopt real measures for the transformation of the bloc into an instrument of general security;

—the expansion of NATO by the SVE countries also opens the alliance's doors for Russia.

Now, on the eve of the NATO summit, the last argument has been particularly emphasized. Russian intelligence experts arrived at the conclusion, however, that the "probing" offers to Russia concerning a partnership with NATO do not imply any impetus for the creation of some international security support mechanism that would correspond by its composition and work to the conditions of the postcommunist period. A notion of

such a mechanism is currently being discussed in the West. The experts in the United States, for instance, are investigating the possibility of creating at this stage an organization for common security that would represent something between NATO on one side and the CSCE and UN on the other one. It is understandable that for Russia, which association it can join, and its status, or what type of partnership relations it can establish through this association, are of primary importance.

In his speech at the "Advancement of Peace in Europe" conference in Madrid on 29 October of this year, attended by experts from NATO, West European Union, EC, and the CSCE, NATO Secretary General Woerner emphasized a number of moments that could lead if not to anxiety then at least to additional questions. He said that in the present state of affairs, in addition to the assurance of common security of the alliance members, its main objective is to maintain the strategic equilibrium in Europe. The latter point can be interpreted as the situation in which NATO even under the new conditions fulfills one of its main tasks from the confrontational period of the Cold War. If that is the case, the shift of the NATO border in the direction of the Russian border requires either a military reinforcement of Russia, which does not correspond, however, to the decisive tasks of the economic development, or the approval of Russia for the assymetry in the security sphere, which also contradicts Russia's interests.

According to another statement made by Woerner, one of the main tasks of NATO is "to transfer" stability to the SVE and Central Asian countries. If the "partnership," or any other form of NATO expansion, involves the intention to include the states of Central Asia in the alliance responsibility zone, this expansion can be rationally interpreted as an alternative to the common security system within the framework of the CIS. The expansion of the NATO responsibility zone to two regions directly neighboring with the Russian Federation on the west and on the south can justify a suspicion that a new geopolitical situation is forming, one that is extremely disadvantageous for Russia.

Military Aspects

Today, we should not issue direct statements similar to those during the Cold War, for instance, about the serious confrontation between the West and the East, between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, and between the United States and the Soviet Union. It is difficult to assume, and would be incorrect to believe, that the geographical expansion of NATO would serve to create a launching ramp for striking a blow to Russia or its allies. However, this conclusion does not mean that NATO's expansion toward the East would not pose a threat to Russia's military security.

The West has been dealing recently with the question what is the Russian Army's position on this issue. Some people believe that the Russian generals tried to strengthen their "increasing clout" over the Russian government, and "push for" the hard line policy in the sphere of national security. Such thinking is spectacular [as published]. In this connection, it is impossible to ignore the fact that the predestination and professional tasks of the Armed Forces have an influence on the Armed Forces' view of the problem of NATO's expansion toward the West. Russia's military command obviously cannot ignore the following facts:

1) As a consequence of NATO's expansion, the largest military alliance in the world is getting very close to the Russian borders. This alliance has a colossal striking potential. This fact requires an essential revaluation of all the defense concepts, the redeployment of the Armed Forces, the reassessment of the operational strategy, the development of additional infrastructure, the redeployment of large contingents of troops, and a change in operations plans and military training. From the military viewpoint, these steps are logical, and must be made irrespective of the fact that in Russia's political plans NATO is no longer considered to be Russia's enemy. The other side would certainly have to adopt similar steps in a similar situation.

2) The implementation of the said measures within a limited time would certainly result in over-drafting the state budget and downgrading Russia' defense capability in the period of the restructuring and redeployment of military forces.

3) It is certain that such conditions would endanger the deadlines for reducing the number of troops, the restructuring and professionalization of the Armed Forces, and their equipping with modern and expensive systems on a high scientific level. To fall behind in this sphere means to qualitatively limit the military potential of the Russian military forces, as compared with the level of the leading military powers.

4) If the Russian Government is unable to regularly finance the Armed Forces, if it cannot provide material and technical supplies to the Armed Forces, and if it is unable to secure the social protection [socialni ochrana] of said forces, dissatisfaction in army circles may grow, which certainly is not in the interests of the political or the military leadership of Russia as a whole.

We also cannot ignore the fact that NATO's expansion would result in NATO's being responsible for the regions of the European continent where borders have been changed following the World War II. This process has taken place at the time when new states are being established, that is the results of the Helsinki Conference—which set up the status quo—have ceased to be valid, or have been significantly diminished. It is therefore possible to assume that under the new conditions, NATO will become the alternative [alternativni] guarantor of the post-war borders in Europe.

Apart from the positive aspects, there are negative aspects to it. Many experts link NATO's "expansion" trend to the growing importance of Germany in this pact. The "preparatory period" of the SVE countries for

full NATO membership is also linked to their bilateral military cooperation with Germany. A number of foreign political scientists have arrived at the conclusion that the increased number of countries in NATO will lead to a change in Germany's status on the European continent. The "addressee" [adresat] of security will become its "exporter". At the same time, there are reasons to assume that certain circles in NATO are looking at NATO's expansion from the viewpoint of the further development of the situation with respect to post-war borders.

The first group of problems in this sphere is associated not only with Germany, but also with other countries. For example, will those forces in Romania preoccupied with the idea of unification with Moldova not begin to assert this process while relying on their membership in NATO and ignoring the interests of the Dniester region? Somehow or other, the idea that the SVE countries' membership in NATO will increase the number of international disputes and conflicts, including territorial ones, is warranted.

Expanding NATO to include the "Visegrad Group" will also provide an incentive for the Baltic states to join the North Atlantic Pact. As a consequence of this, the situation could arise whereby the center of gravity for their cooperation with the West could shrink to the military sphere. This would be regarded as a challenge to Russia, because the military presence of third countries in this region runs counter to its geopolitical interests. The leadership of the North Atlantic Pact emphasizes that it is not its intention to turn the SVE countries into a "cordon sanitaire" that would cut Russia off from Western Europe. Nevertheless, this could happen, regardless of the subjective intentions of NATO's leading officials. In any event, a barrier will be erected between Russia and the rest of the continent by the SVE countries' entry into this organization. It is also necessary to take into consideration the fact that a change in the composition of NATO's membership will paralyze a whole series of the Alliance's international undertakings proceeding from multilateral agreements and treaties, especially from the Treaty on Conventional Weapons in Europe, the observance of which is the basis for stability and security throughout the continent.

This Treaty on Conventional Weapons in Europe—as is known—was based on the concept of equal security and its aim was to achieve, by the end of 1995, parity in conventional weapons between the two groups of states (NATO and the former Warsaw Pact) by guaranteeing the same amount of combat hardware for the ground and air forces. In the event of NATO's expansion to include the countries of the former Warsaw Pact, the principle of parity will be infringed. Thus, not only the quotas for the conventional weapons of NATO's potential new members, but also those of the CIS countries—and, first and foremost, Russia—would be placed in doubt.

Apart from this, a problem would arise for the "Visegrad Group" countries in implementing the supervision of joint obligations concerning the hand-over of weapons and in supervising their number (Article VII), in carrying out controls and inspections (Article XIV), and so on.

It is essential to point out that any kind of amendments to the agreement that Russia has striven for during the past 18 months to 2 years at bilateral and multilateral meetings, have met with stiff resistance and a negative response on the part of NATO. The message from President Yeltsin to NATO leaders (of September 1993), which contained a proposal to repeatedly review the "lateral" [bocni] restrictions for Russia's Armed Forces (Article V) was virtually rejected by NATO representatives. There is a great deal of evidence that the bloc is to maintain this stance until the end of 1995, that is, until restrictions on conventional weapons come to an end in accordance with the aforementioned treaty.

The Domestic Political Aspects

The possible unfavorable impact of NATO's expansion on the political situation in Russia and on the Russian people's psychological approach must not be overlooked. Public opinion in Russia has long been shaped in a spirit of opposition to NATO and cannot be changed all at once. In this context, expanding the zone of NATO's responsibility to include the former USSR's allies would be perceived—in the current situation—by a significant number of people as "bringing danger closer to Russia's borders." This could provide an incentive for anti-Western forces in Russia and could furnish them with the arguments for deliberately attempting to discredit the government's course. In such conditions, this could lead to the revival in the country of the ideas espoused by the "deposed camp" and also of isolationist tendencies and the negative streams flowing from them against the current reformist tide.

Russian social awareness should mature and NATO should be perceived as an European structure of stability and security, not as an inimical power striving for political and military superiority over its principal enemy from Cold War times.

Based on the presented analysis, to be modified in accordance with new information, Russian intelligence experts arrived at the following conclusions:

—In the post-communist period, when the so-called "block discipline" [blokova disciplina] that existed before the liquidation of the Warsaw Pact no longer existed, Russia has no right to dictate to sovereign countries of Central and Eastern Europe as to whether they should join NATO or any other international organization.

—It would be in the Russian interest if NATO's expansion of its zone of responsibility proceeded alongside a transformation of the character of this pact and its functions were adjusted to the requirements of the current stage of historical development.

—When considering the SVE countries' joining NATO, the character of this joining and its deadlines, and the rights and obligations of the new members, the opinions of all the interested countries—and Russia is one of them—should be taken into account, and so should all prospects for strengthening the principles of collective security on the continent, the development of pan-European cooperation, and guarantees that all countries aspiring for NATO membership will respect the international obligations they have assumed.

—Only the sum of all these factors could help create prerequisites and favorable conditions for good mutual relations between the Russian Federation and NATO, as well as the transformation of their relations into a real partnership.

—Currently, it would be advantageous to conduct multilateral policy on the worldwide development of cooperation between all the national institutions that are able to contribute to the establishment of a general collective security system in Europe.

Article Says Joining NATO Reason for BIS

AU1412161693 Prague MLADA FRONTA DNES in Czech 10 Dec 93 p 7

[Ivan Jemelka article: "The Security and Information Service Tries to Shadow Russian Agents"]

[Text] The Security and Information Service [BIS] has a reason to be angry. They have inconspicuously and patiently gathered information on the activity of Russian intelligence on our territory. Now, much of this activity has been disclosed. The BIS passed information on Russian agents to deputies, and some of them had nothing better to do then to pass it on others. Maybe, our counterintelligence service has made a tactical error divulging its secrets to the 200-member parliament but, on the other hand, it is understandable that counterintelligence had to show some results to justify its budget for the next year.

There may be yet another reason for the fact that the BIS has decided to announce the results of shadowing Russian agents to as many people as possible. The chief of Russian intelligence, Yevgeniy Primakov, held a news conference in Moscow at the end of November, at which he made no secret about the fact that his people had been well informed about the steps the Czech side had taken regarding the Czech Republic's joining NATO. This made Prague more interested in the activity of Russian intelligence in the Czech Republic. After the indiscretion of parliament, Primakov found out from the Czech papers that the BIS had discovered his efforts to hide his agents outside the [Russian] embassy.

Along with the purely professional competition raging between intelligence services, the recent rivalry between Czech and Russian intelligence services has assumed a more profound significance. Russia offers itself to the world as a guarantor of security in the region of the former Eastern Block. However, the Czech Republic seeks to belong to that part of the world where security is guaranteed by the United States and other NATO members. There are cultural, historical, and also economic reasons for it. Russian and Czech interests are not always the same. Moscow would certainly want Prague to welcome, at an international forum, Russian efforts to reopen its protective umbrellas over Central Europe, under which the Czech Republic would disappear from the view of the world, however. On the other hand, Prague would like Moscow to recognize the fact that eradicating Czechia from the European context after World War II was absolutely nonsensical. Each side would like to know how could it force the other side to accept interests that are incompatible with its own. Interior Minister Jan Ruml said that the Czech secret service will send its agents abroad, particularly to the countries that lie east of our republic. Russian papers wrote that the Czechs may be angry at the activity of Russian intelligence services, but have no experience or means to cause problems to Russian professionals. Of course, one side may be jabbing the other in efforts to provoke it to divulge more. Behind these stories, however, they may be one of the main reasons for the existence of our intelligence services. Not only terrorism, international crime, and massive frauds are the reasons for this existence, but also our efforts to return the Czech Republic back to Europe.

A hidden duel between secret services usually sets up the direction of the work of other security services of the state. Russia has its military doctrine, from which it is not clear what Russia considers to be its sphere of influence. The Czech Republic does not have a similar doctrine. We have only the assurances of the Defense Ministry, according to which there is no danger from any direction. Let us hope it will stay that way.

Olechowski, Czech's Zieleniec on NATO Hopes

LD0912205793 Warsaw PAP in English 1807 GMT 9 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec. 9—The Polish and Czech foreign ministers on Thursday said they present similar stand on the question of the expansion of NATO and on the U.S. "peace for partnership" proposal.

Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski and his Czech counterpart Josef Zieleniec issued a joint statement after their Thursday meeting in which they stressed that both countries are waiting for a "clear signal" from NATO states during the January NATO summit.

Both ministers stated that the summit in Brussels should send a clear and understandable to all signal that the pact is not a closed community, but a transforming structure, which, sooner or later, will admit central and East European countries as its new members with the intention to expand the sphere of European values.

The two diplomats said in the statement that also the U.S. "partnership for peace" proposal is a important

step in the transformation process within NATO. If the proposal is gradually supplemented with a clearly visible political dimension, it will give an equal opportunity to all those wishing to become a NATO member to display their ability to take over not only the rights but also obligations stemming from the Washington treaty.

Minister Zieleniec asked whether Visegrad Group states will unite their efforts to become NATO members said: "We will go side by side and in the same direction. I cannot say whether we will apply together for NATO membership, but I doubt it."

The two foreign ministers of the neighbouring countries also discussed the state of economic relations and bilateral cooperation. Both sides announced plans to sign an agreement on trans-border cooperation early next year.

Zieleniec: Iran Exports for Peaceful Purposes

AU1512203793 Prague CTK in English 2249 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] Prague, Dec 14 (CTK)—The possible Czech exports to Iran cannot be used for any but peaceful purposes, Czech Foreign Minister Josef Zieleniec told CTK on his return from Israel.

He stressed that no contracts for deliveries to Iran had been concluded, while only a few Czech business people were considering them. "There is a long way from this kind of considerations to the concrete projects," Zieleniec said. The nuclear technology is not a field in which the Czech Republic could compete with world exporters, he added.

During Zieleniec's three-day visit to Israel, the Israeli media devoted a great attention to the suspicion that Czech companies were about to export components which could be used in the Iranian nuclear program.

Modernization on Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant

AU1412114293 Prague HOSPODARSKE NOVINY in Czech 10 Dec 93 p 6

[Zdenek Zuntych report: "Dukovany Nuclear Power Plant Is Getting Ready for the Modernization of Its Power-Generating Units"]

[Text] Work on the modernization of individual power-generating units has started at the Dukovany nuclear power station (EDU), which has four VVER [water-moderated water-cooled reactor] 440 pressurized water reactors. This work should culminate in the year 1997, while the EDU's reconstruction proper should take place in the years 1998-2003. For the time being, most of this work (appraisal of the technical condition and comparison with world standards after the year 2000) is being carried out by the EDU's own resources. At the same time, a tender is underway in which a foreign supplier is to be found, the power plant's service life is being assessed, and the rate of return on the funds to be invested in modernization is being calculated.

The modernization should not only enhance safety, but, at the same time, it should extend the service life of the power plant, which was completed in 1985. "The service life of a nuclear power plant in Germany is usually set at 40 years, while in our country, where nuclear power plants are based on Soviet-type reactors, it is 25 to 30 years. The reconstruction of the EDU's power-generating units should extend the correct time of their operation [korektni doba provozovani] to 30 years," says Vladivoj Reznik, head of the EDU's engineering and technical services. "I see no reason why the power plant should not operate even longer than that, provided that its equipment meets all the quality norms. That is an economic issue, however, and hinges on the evaluation of the rate of return on the invested funds. Extending the service life and, by the same token, enhancing safety costs enormous sums of money. Increasing safety by a factor of one [o jeden rad] costs about 50 percent of the price of a new power plant."

Regarding the EDU, reconstruction is not expected to cost more than the construction of a new source of energy. There is talk about a sum in the order of 10 billion korunas [Kc]. At the time of its construction, the EDU cost Kc25 billion.

According to Vladivoj Reznik, a minor modernization of the nuclear power plant started in 1992 because some components supplied during the construction period from then socialist countries are becoming worn-out and obsolete. Although spare parts from the former Soviet Union had been supplied for several years in advance, the stocks are likely to be depleted by 1996. Therefore, they are already being replaced with parts procured in Western European countries.

The Dukovany nuclear power plant generates about 25 percent of the Czech Republic's electricity. The production costs average Kc0.28 per kilowatt hour (coal-burning power stations generate electricity at a cost of Kc0.48 per kilowatt hour). According to EDU Director General Jiri Vagner, the low price is distorted by the fact that electricity is being generated here from fuel that had been purchased at non-standard prices. It is expected that, as soon as new fuel starts being supplied, the price of one kilowatt hour from the EDU will go up by about Kc0.11, which probably still will not be its final price. With the establishment of the Fund for the Final Liquidation of Spent Fuel, the price of one kilowatt hour should go up by another Kc0.11.

In 1985, the EDU employed some 2,600 people, now it employs about 2,000 people. The target figure is 1,800. The labor force is being reduced, first and foremost, by setting apart some operations, particularly repair operations, and turning them into independent entrepreneurial units.

Meciar: Hungarian Autonomy Plan 'Borders on Crime'

AU1512203693 Prague CTK in English 2332 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 14 (CTK)— Slovakia has a united territory and the citizens have a uniform citizenship, therefore any attempt to divide the territory borders on crime, Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar said on Slovak Television tonight. He was reacting to a demand by the Association of Towns and Villages of Zitny Ostrov (SMOZO) to create a Hungarian province in south Slovakia. South Slovakia is heavily inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, who in all of Slovakia number some 560,000 or 11 percent of Slovakia's population.

Meciar said the demand had nothing to do with the protection of ethnic minority rights. The organizers of such moves must expect the state to react to their demands, he warned. "We are against any hysteria being unleashed against citizens of Hungarian nationality, they are our regular citizens," Meciar pointed out. He said calls to found a "Hungarian Parliament" in Slovakia have been old several months and "we are neither deaf nor blind," Meciar stressed. He noted that there was certain controversy between the political parties in parliament and the Hungarian parties maintain the balance. This gives them an opportunity to gain political capital, he added.

The SMOZO has convoked a meeting of local elected officials in Komarno, south Slovakia, on January 8. The meeting is allegedly to establish a "Hungarian Province" and elect a 100-member assembly.

Kovac Warns Hungarians

LD1612063293 Bratislava Rozhlasova Stanica Slovensko Network in Slovak 1730 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] At the beginning of this week, a statement of the Council of Towns and Villages of Zitny Ostrov from 6 December stirred up people's minds in our country. The statement contained an appeal to convene a state-wide assembly in Komarno on 8 January 1994, with the aim of setting up a self-administering province with a special legal status.

The Slovak president, Michal Kovac, has made a statement on this today for Slovak radio, the press agency [TASR], and Slovak television.

[Begin Kovac recording] In past few days, our public has been stirred up by the appeal of the Association of the Towns and Villages of Zitny Ostrov which was published in 'Uj Szo' on 7 December. The president and his advisers discussed it on 8 December and decided to adopt some measures: that it would be necessary, among other things, to visit the Komarno and Dunajska Streda districts [two districts in Zitny Ostrov with a significant Hungarian minority] and to find out from the appeal's organizers and writers what it is all about. This has been organized, and people acting on my behalf visited the Dunajska Streda district and talked to the head of the district office. They also went to the Komarno district where they spoke to the head of the district office and to the Komarno mayor—the Association' chairman and one of the main organizers of the state-wide assembly of the deputies to the Slovak parliament, to the former federal parliament, to the local representative bodies and of the mayors.

I have also decided to discuss the matter with the representantives of political parties and movements in the parliament, and for that reason I have convened a meeting on Sunday [19 December] at 1500. Political representatives of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement and political representatives of Egyuetteles are also to take part in it. This afternoon I am to meet the heads of the Egyutteles deputy club in parliament.

I do not intend to take a stance on the matter until we have detailed information. Some information and intentions, contained in the appeal, enable me, however, to take a clear stance on some issues already today. Among other things, it is important that at this Slovak-wide assembly of the above mentioned representatives a principle was adopted on setting up a province, or a special territorial unit, from Komarno to Ukraine, that is southern Slovakia, which would become an independent province or region.

It must be said clearly—as has been said before me by the speaker of parliament and others—that this is absolutely unacceptable for the Slovak Republic as it contravenes the constitution of the Slovak Republic. This is a dangerous game played by some politicians who are either aware of what they are doing or not aware of it. Therefore I would like to appeal in particular to our Hungarian fellow citizens to distinguish very scrupulously, carefully and cautiously which demands of their political representatives are really in harmony with their interests and which represent the narrow political interests of a small group of people.

It is, after all, clear to all politicians and mayors that the Slovak government is preparing a new territorial arrangement and, in addition, it is also working on a further shift of competences from the central state authorities to the local and municipal representative bodies.

A substantial decentralization is being worked on. It will enable the representative bodies of towns and villages to pass decisions about very important issues concerning the life of their inhabitants. Yet, in spite of this, effort is being made to call for territorial autonomy. If a different variant of territorial arrangement was advocated it would be a different story. The objective of this appeal and, probably, of this assembly is, however, to set up an autonomous region.

In conclusion, I would like to ask the leading political representantives of the Hungarian minority, and the deputies and mayors to think seriously about the steps which they have taken so far. This is a very dangerous

game which does not tackle any vitally important issues for the Hungarian minority, but aims at stirring up perpetual commotion. I cannot accept the principle that this is caused by the fact that the current government is leading the country to destruction, that the current political leadership of the country is creating social unrest and so on. I have stressed on a number of occasions that the justified demands of the minorities can be tackled in a peaceful atmosphere. They cannot be solved by coercion. It is, therefore, necessary to create the atmosphere of mutual trust and cooperation in the entire society and in parliament. A territorial arrangement cannot be a topic for any state-wide assembly but only for the Slovak parliament. The political representatives of the Hungarian minorities and the deputies of the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement and of Egyutteles must also make their contribution to making it possible for the Slovak parliament to pass warranted requests.

Gasparovic Denounces Plan

AU1512203493 Prague CTK in English 1747 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 14 (CTK)— The idea of the Association of Towns and Villages of Zitny Ostrov (SMOZO) to establish a "Hungarian province" with its own self-rule is very unfortunate and inopportune, Slovak Parliament Chairman Ivan Gasparovic told Slovak Radio today. South Slovakia is largely inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, who in all of Slovakia number some 560,000 or 11 percent of Slovakia's population. According to Gasparovic, this sort of action encroaches on state sovereignty since the existing situation cannot be resolved only by regional bodies, but evidently by supreme level bodies. For this reason, he has agreed with Slovak President Michal Kovac that they would meet SMOZO representatives on Sunday [19 December], he added.

SMOZO representatives have misinterpreted the recommendation by the Council of Europe which allegedly approved of this kind of activities, Gasparovic stated. "Slovakia is a sovereign state which organizes its administrative set-up by itself. This is no one else's business," Gasparovic said.

Peter Weiss, first parliament deputy chairman and leader of the left-wing opposition Democratic Left Party (SDL), said he did not assume that the issue would be discussed at the next session of the Slovak Parliament which is to start tomorrow. It is necessary to bear in mind that the Slovak public is very sensitive about any mention of regional autonomy or change in the borders, Weiss stated. "If someone does not want to take this into account, then he is a political amateur," Weiss said.

Mayor Defends Autonomy Plan

AU1512203593 Prague CTK in English 2140 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 14 (CTK)— The proposal to create a self-rule region from the south Slovak districts does not imply "irredentism," Komarno Mayor Istvan Pasztor told CTK today. South Slovakia is largely inhabited by ethnic Hungarians, who in all of Slovakia number some 560,000 or 11 percent of Slovakia's population.

Pasztor reacted to the emotions provoked in Slovakia by the convocation of local elected officials by the Association of Towns and Villages of Zitny Ostrov (SMOZO) in south Slovakia on January 8 in Komarno, the largest Hungarian-inhabited city in Slovakia. The meeting is allegedly to establish a "Hungarian province" and to elect a 100-member assembly. On December 7 the MKDH-Egyutteles (ethnic Hungarian parties) leadership supported the SMOZO call. On December 13 Slovak supreme constitutional representatives discussed the call which stirred up great controversy.

Pasztor explained, however, the planned meeting as a debate which would be held according to the Slovak petition law. The event, to which local Slovaks are invited, is connected with the government proposal of the new administrative set-up with which the ethnic Hungarian representatives disagree, Pasztor said. The meeting is to establish a petition committee which will advocate, in line with Slovak laws, the ideas of south Slovak population on the administrative set-up.

"We have experienced for a long time poor investment to the southern (ethnically) mixed districts which has affected both local Hungarians and Slovaks," Pasztor stated. "Everything we are doing is in harmony with Slovak laws. We want to settle our affairs together. Not a single Slovak may be hurt. If the Slovaks made up a minority in a place, they would not suffer any damage. If the region develops, the Slovaks will benefit, too," Pasztor assured CTK. "Hungarian autonomy is not the goal. That would be hard to claim as there are no purely Hungarian regions," Pasztor said. The Hungarian minority is striving for regional self-rule within the planned reform of the Slovak administrative set-up, while southern Slovakia would be bilingual "as it was in the first republic (pre-war Czechoslovakia)," Pasztor said.

Hungarians Appeal for Assembly

AU1612084793 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Dec 93 p 2

["Complete text" of documents published by the Association of Towns and Communities of Zitny Ostrov in the Hungarian-language daily UJ SZO on 7 and 8 December 1993, followed by a Roman Kalisky commentary: "A Historic Assembly"]

[Text] Esteemed fellow mayors and deputies!

We are appealing to you about a crucial matter! For the first time in its history, the Association of Towns and Communities of Zitny Ostrov is organizing a nationwide assembly of all the elected deputies, mayors, and parliamentary deputies from South Slovakia.

Why have we decided to convene a nationwide assembly?

So that we can express our unanimous opinion: **The government of this country is leading us to ruin.** It is placing restrictions on our development, it is preventing us from implementing the rights that pertain to individuals and collectives in every law-governed state, and it is withholding part of our communities' justifiable material claims. It is curtailing our self-administrative rights and the development of our local self-administrations. It is planning the kind of territorial-administrative reorganization—and it wants to implement it over our heads—that we experienced during the era of centralized state administration and the totalitarian system. This would encroach upon the principle of self-administration and would mean us being deprived of our rights anew.

The country's political leadership is spreading the kind of propaganda that causes social unrest and sets the coexisting Slovaks and Hungarians against each other. The Hungarians are made out to be the enemies of Slovakia. It wants to pit the Hungarians in South Slovakia and their democratically elected parliamentary deputies against each other.

The warning signs characterizing our social, political, and economic situation force us to convene a **nationwide assembly of the Hungarian deputies elected in this extensive region, deputies who share the same interests as us.**

We are aware that—according to all the evidence—the greatest tolerance prevails in this extensive region **between Bratislava and the Ukrainian border,** the region where the 600,000-strong Hungarian population of Slovakia lives. The good mutual relations between the Hungarian and Slovak populations in this region—to which they are linked by their historical roots—create, in contradiction to the atmosphere in other parts of the country, the fundamental prerequisites for productive social relations and the effective development of economic life. We must cause this value to appreciate by means of our joint will, so let us formulate it together: **Throughout the territory inhabited by a significant part of the Hungarian population, it is necessary to establish a province with its own self-administration and public administration and with a special legal status based on Council of Europe Recommendation No. 1201. A region with such legal status would preserve and build upon those European values that in our region in past decades have gradually worn away.**

Along with this, we will formulate our **definitive claims to resolve the legal status of the Hungarian ethnic community in Slovakia** in harmony with the draft constitutional law drawn up by the parliamentary deputies from the Hungarian coalition. At the same time, we proclaim that the rights of Slovaks—who live in the same region as us, but, compared with us, are in the minority—cannot be curtailed.

Let us elect a 100-member body from among the participants in the assembly, a body that we will entrust with implementing the assembly's resolutions.

Another special mission of this historically important assembly is that, in our opinion, it could by means of its points of view **unite the politically divided Hungarians in Slovakia.** The joint concepts formulated about our fate would not become prey to party struggles. They would sustain us all by their moral strength.

Therefore, we are turning with our appeal to all the mayors, self-administration deputies, and parliamentary deputies from South Slovakia, regardless of their political and ideological affiliation: Take part in the **nationwide assembly in Komarno on 8 January 1994!**

The Association of Towns and Communities of Zitny Ostrov Council.

Komarno, 6 December 1993.

UJ SZO, 7 December 1993.

A Declaration of Support

"The members of the leadership of Egyutteles and the Hungarian Christian Democratic Movement agree with the appeal published by the Association of Towns and Communities of Zitny Ostrov. They decided at yesterday's coordination meeting that they would express in a statement their support for the nationwide assembly to be held on 8 January 1994 and that they would appeal to all elected deputies and mayors from South Slovakia to take part in it."

UJ SZO, 8 December 1993.

For How Long Will We Make Concessions?

Let us return to this whole irredentist matter. However, this time, I will only make a comment, issue a warning, and ask a few questions.

Comment: The reference to Council of Europe Parliamentary Assembly Recommendation No. 1201 is a deception. This entire recommendation has not come into effect because of the ambiguous formulation of Article 11 concerning the ethnic (not national!) minorities. Therefore, it is described only as a working version. All documents of this nature emphasize the need to proceed from the legal code of the appropriate state and especially to ensure that, by respecting certain articles of the recommendations, the rights of the majority nation are not endangered and the state's territorial integrity is not put at risk!

Warning for the prosecutor general: The formulation that the country's political leadership (presumably meaning the president, parliament, and government) is punishable.

Questions: What point of view will the National Council of the Slovak Republic adopt? What will the Slovak Government do? What measures will the interior minister—who is responsible for the state's internal security—take? And finally: In this situation, should the president not make a public statement?

Meciar on Coalition Problems With Budget

AU1512203893 Prague CTK in English 1057 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 15 (CTK)— The emergency routine may have to be followed concerning the HZDS-SNS coalition agreement, Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar said on Slovak Television's "Press Club" program last night, adding that chairman of the Slovak National Party (SNS) Ludovit Cernak has told him he did not support the budget in its proposed form. Some Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) members had expressed dissatisfaction at Cernak's attitude, Meciar said. He said that the budget, which the Slovak Parliament is debating today, was to a certain extent a test of the strength of the coalition agreement, because its first steps had not been exceptionally happy ones.

Any party can announce that the emergency routine be followed, if the coalition is threatened. The leaders of the coalition parties must meet and come to an agreement. If they do not, the possibility exists of withdrawing from the coalition agreement, Meciar said. "We will wait and see how our partner behaves with the budget," Meciar said, adding that if the budget was not accepted, it would cause no problems legally, but from the political point of view the present uncertainty would be deepened. He said that a political struggle was forming around the budget. There was an attempt to provoke a budget crisis, and through that a government crisis, Meciar said, adding that the opposition was united on that point. The parties did not want to discuss the budget with the government, he said. They proclaimed their willingness to communicate, but when they had expert sessions they did not invite government experts to explain their views, Meciar said.

Meciar said it was realistic to expect the decline in the Slovak economy to stop next year.

HZDS Members Deny Meciar Speech Authenticity

AU1512181693 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 13 Dec 93 pp 1, 2

[TA SR report: "Text Is Not Authentic; Lexa Has Support"]

[Excerpt] Trebisov—The participants in the closed Movement for a Democratic Slovakia [HZDS] meeting at Zlata Idka have declared that the text [of Prime Minister Meciar's speech at the meeting] published in SLOVENSKY VYCHOD and some other dailies is not authentic and is tendentiously oriented. "We fully condemn such methods of fabricating disinformation as they are unacceptable in a democratic and pluralist society. We perceive them as an attempt to destabilize the political life in our young republic," read a statement by participants in the closed meeting of HZDS representatives from east Slovakia held at Zlata Idka. The statement was approved at a meeting of the HZDS National Board in Trebisov on Saturday [11 December].

Out of 63 HZDS National Board members, 57 members who were present approved the resolution, part of which was the statement on Zlata Idka. [passage omitted]

Opposition To Discuss 'Alternative' to Meciar

AU1612070293 Prague CTK in English 2056 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 15 (CTK)—Jan Carnogursky, chairman of the opposition Christian Democratic Movement (KDH), told CTK that today's approval of the Agreement on Slovakia's Association with the EC by the Slovak Parliament was a demonstrative gesture. "It is an important event in Slovakia's life, as the association agreement embeds the country's future orientation," said Carnogursky, former Slovak premier from April 1991 to June 1992. He added that the agreement helped implement European standards in solving all problems in Slovakia.

Carnogursky denied that an agreement was to be concluded at the envisaged meeting of the chairmen of the opposition parties on the way of voting on the government draft state budget at the current parliamentary session. "The (way of deputies') voting is actually known. It seems that the non-government parties will vote against the budget," Carnogursky stated. The meeting of the opposition parties' chairmen is expected to deal with working out a program of the government policy alternative to the one of the present cabinet of Vladimir Meciar, Carnogursky said. He said he was convinced that the present opposition was able to offer a short-term alternative to Meciar's government.

Asked whether or not the opposition chairmen would discuss the possibility of early elections at their meeting on Monday [20 December], Carnogursky answered that "the problem was excessively narrowed." "An alternative program of the government policy cannot be reduced to the question of early elections," he stated.

Parliament Ratifies EC Association Agreement

AU1612070493 Prague CTK in English 1538 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 15 (CTK)—At its session today the Slovak Parliament approved the Agreement on Slovakia's Association with European Community (EC). The agreement was signed on October 4, 1993 in Luxembourg. The parliament approved the agreement almost unanimously. 112 deputies voted in favor of it

and one deputy abstained. Before the vote, representatives of all deputies' groups supported the Association Agreement as Slovakia's so far most important document, which helps the country to be heading for its strategic goal: integration into the European Union.

The agreement was signed by Slovak Premier Vladimir Meciar and EC representatives in Luxembourg on October 4, 1993. It was necessitated by the fact that the Association Agreement between the EC and the Czechoslovak Federation, signed in December 1991, was not ratified, did not take effect, and therefore could not be transferred onto the Czechoslovakia's two successor states, the Czech and Slovak Republics, after the federation's split on January 1, 1993. Nevertheless, a temporary trade agreement was effective all the time, with its validity having been extended indefinitely.

The report on the presented agreement says that the EC has helped Slovakia easing the access of its products to the "Twelve's" market. The agreement also provides for the establishment of political dialogue. The EC Commission offered good offices in seeking a solution to the Slovak-Hungarian dispute over the Gabcikovo- Nagymaros water works on the Danube, which resulted in the case being lodged with The Hague-based International Court of Justice.

The report says that a future membership of the European Union means taking over such commitments as stability of democracy, building a law-abiding state, observance of human rights, and ethnic minority protection. At the same time, the market economy of a country striving for the membership must be able to cope with competition within the European Union as well as to take over commitments stemming from political, economic, and monetary union, the report says.

Unlike the original Czechoslovak-EC Association Agreement, the Slovak-EC agreement includes the "suspension clause," under which the agreement can be abrogated if the principles of democracy, human rights, and market economy are violated. Slovak diplomats provided out that this clause was included in agreements with all countries, and was neither oriented against Slovakia, nor did it cast doubts on the observance of human rights in the country.

Slovakia has also managed to defend all commercial advantages originally included in the EC-Czechoslovak agreement. The asymmetric liberalization of bilateral trade, advantageous for Slovakia and valid since March 1, 1992, will thus remain intact. According to optimistic estimations, the EC member countries would ratify the agreement by the end of the autumn of 1994, and the document might take effect as of January 1, 1995.

Government Releases Funds for Arms Conversion

AU1612071093 Prague CTK in English 2104 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 15 (CTK)—The Slovak Government at today's session approved a transfer of funds from the budget of the Ministry of Defense and the Ministry of Economy to finance programs converting military production to civilian purposes. The government's press section reported that the government proposed that a total of 301 million Slovak korunas (about $9 million) would be distributed among these projects. The remaining 199 million Slovak korunas will be released in 1994. The Slovak Ministry of Finance had designated 500 million Slovak korunas for structural changes and conversion. The money was distributed among 42 conversion projects. A small portion of the money designated for conversion was spent by the government on other purposes, according to its press section.

'Slight Progress' in Slovak-German Talks

AU1512194293 Prague CTK in English 1533 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 15 (CTK)—Slovak Foreign Minister Jozef Moravcik said today that during his German visit on Monday [13 December] "a slight progress" had been made in the question of compensation for Slovak victims of Nazism. "Germany is ready to solve some very urgent individual cases, meaning persons in unfavorable conditions, which could be individually improved," Moravcik said. "At present Germany is not ready to solve the problem generally and to the full extent we had proposed," he stated.

Moravcik stressed that Slovakia continued to enjoy Germany's support in its integration into the European Union as well as in its striving to establish closer ties with NATO, as it followed from his (Moravcik's) talks with the German foreign and defense ministers, Klaus Kinkel and Volker Ruehe.

Slovakia expects the Partnership for Peace project to provide for differentiated attitudes to the Central and Eastern European applicants for NATO membership, Moravcik said. "We intend to profit from this and expect a more accommodating stand of the NATO countries, mainly in view of the results of the Russian elections," he stressed. "Our stance was understood, we will have Germany's support in our effort to get closer to NATO," he added.

Moravcik quoted the NATO members as saying in reaction to the Russian elections that no essential change could be expected regarding the Central and Eastern European countries' integration into NATO. He said that the "more accommodating stands" claimed by Slovakia, would mean Moravcik understands the creation of more favorable conditions for concluding and realizing bilateral agreements between Slovakia and the individual NATO member countries [sentence as received].

Parliament Ratifies Slovak-U.S. Tax Agreement

AU1612070093 Prague CTK in English 1828 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bratislava, Dec 15 (CTK)—The Slovak Parliament today passed a law establishing a human rights center in the country. Justice Minister Katarina Tothova said the new Slovak National Center for Human Rights would primarily be disseminating educational and promotional material. Its operation will be financed for the first two years by the Netherlands, and after that from the Slovak state budget. Parliament also ratified an agreement with the United States on limiting double taxation and preventing income and property tax revenue losses.

Paper Reports National Council Deputy's Death

AU1512143493 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 14 Dec 93 p 2

[TA SR report: "Ivor Surovy Has Died"]

[Text] Bratislava—Ivor Surovy, Movement For a Democratic Slovakia deputy in the National Council of the Slovak Republic, aged 46, died on Sunday [12 December]. He worked on the National Economy and Budget Committee of the National Council of the Slovak Republic. The funeral will take place in the House of Eternal Rest in Prievidza on 17 December 1993.

Kosice Mayor Bans Romany Demonstration

AU1612081293 Prague CTK in English 1756 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Kosice, east Slovakia, Dec 15 (CTK)— The demonstration which Romanies planned to hold on Saturday [18 December] has been postponed because the mayor of Kosice-Stare Mesto [Old City] has notified the organizers that he was not permitting the event, Mikulas Horvath said today. Horvath, the demonstration's chief organizer and spokesman for the Slovak Union of Romanies' Civic Initiative, estimated that some 10,000 Romanies would have taken part in the demonstration. It was to be held under the motto "We Want to be Equal Citizens" and was to draw attention to what Horvath called the deteriorating status of Romanies in society and the government's unwillingness to solve Romany problems.

The mayor explained his refusal to authorize the demonstration by citing fears for people's security because the demonstration was to take place in one of the busiest places in the center of Kosice at a time of intensive Christmas shopping. He also recommended another place for the demonstration, but the Romany organizers rejected it. "We cannot agree with being pushed aside," Horvath said.

Statistical Office Updates Foreign Investment

AU1512162293 Bratislava REPUBLIKA in Slovak 11 Dec 93 p 3

[TA SR report: "Statistics on Foreign Participation; Austrian Capital Plays the First Fiddle"]

[Text] With 24 percent, Austria has the highest share of foreign capital invested in Slovakia. It is followed by the FRG with around 21 percent; U.S. and Czech capital with almost 14 and 11 percent respectively; and French capital with 9 percent.

The influx to Slovakia of foreign capital, which the Slovak Statistical Office has been monitoring for three years, is growing. By the end of September 1993 it reached 10.1 billion Slovak korunas [Sk], that is, over $350 million. Most of it is concentrated in manufacturing (more than Sk5 billion), retailing, transportation, and services (some Sk2 billion), banking and insurance (over Sk1 billion), and real estate (over Sk551 million).

Foreign capital directly participates in 4,521 organizations in Slovakia. Investors from South Korea account for the highest proportion of foreign capital invested in one organization—they have invested more than Sk323 million per firm. Substantially smaller volumes of foreign capital per firm have been invested by French, Swedish, Dutch, and Canadian businessmen.

Boross Cited on Nomination for Prime Minister

AU1512142093 Budapest MTI in English 0907 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Budapest, 15 Dec (MTI)—If it is authorized by parliament, the government of Peter Boross will not significantly differ from Jozsef Antall's cabinet, said Boross in an interview published by the daily PESTI HIRLAP on Wednesday [15 December].

The leading bodies of the Hungarian Democratic Forum nominated Interior Minister Peter Boross, chairman of the caretaker government and deputy chairman of the party, as candidate for prime minister. Regarding his nomination, Boross said, "considering that parliamentary groups of the other two coalition parties (the Christian Democratic People's Party and the 36-member group of the Independent Smallholders Party) also found me suitable for the post, I feel that, in line with European practice, the president will submit my candidacy to parliament."

The daily asked Boross whether there were grounds for fears that he is a politician standing to the right of the centre represented by the late Antall.

"I think developments will disprove concerns, including concerns that elections may be postponed. My main goal is to lead the country up to the elections, preserving constitutionality," Boross said.

Boross Interviewed on Tasks

AU1612094593 Budapest UJ MAGYARORSZAG in Hungarian 15 Dec 93 pp 1,5

[Interview with Peter Boross, interior minister and acting prime minister, by Janos Papp in parliament on 14 December: "Boross: Moral Command"]

[Text] Peter Boross has been nominated as prime minister and has not had a minute of free time since. He answered our questions in parliament on 14 December.

[Papp] Mr Boross! At a joint meeting, the National Committee of the Hungarian Democratic Forum [MDF] and the MDF parliamentary group decided to nominate you for the position of prime minister. Taking Hungary's interests into consideration, what do you regard as the most important thing now and in the near future?

[Boross] I have deliberately refrained from making any statement on this so far. I think the most important thing is that, by accepting this nomination, I have fulfilled Jozsef Antall's wish. This can also be interpreted as a moral command. During one of our last meetings, Jozsef Antall asked me to accept the challenge and the task. I think the most important thing is to carry out pragmatic, professional, and efficient government action by preserving and further developing the elements indicated by Jozsef Antall.

[Papp] Both in the course of nominating a prime minister and during the meeting of the MDF's National Committee in Lakitelek over the weekend, it seemed that the MDF had never been so united following the big tragedy that affected this nation and this country.

[Boross] Irrespective of the fact that I have been nominated as prime minister, let me say that I felt a strong power in the MDF yesterday, and I think that a party that can show such a power in such a difficult situation will be a very serious factor in the next elections, in spite of all the speculations.

[Papp] You had a relatively lengthy discussion with Istvan Csurka in Parliament. Could you tell us what was the subject of your discussion?

[Boross] If you think we made some kind of a political agreement, you are mistaken. Istvan Csurka initiated the discussion, and I am ready to talk to the representatives of all the political trends if I am asked to; moreover, there are people whom I ask for an exchange of views. If you think we made some kind of pact or agreement, I can tell you that nothing like this took place.

[Papp] Did you talk about the vote of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party [MIEP] at the budget debate?

[Boross] As far as I know, they are not very enthusiastic about the budget and, according to my information, they are preparing to vote against it.

[Papp] Did you talk about the possible MIEP demands?

[Boross] No, no. This has already taken place in the form of various messages but, if Parliament accepts my nomination, one will be able to draw several conclusions from the facts and the government list.

[Papp] Many people are speculating about the name of the new prime minister. Several people are mentioning the name of MDF parliamentary group leader Imre Konya.

[Boross] I have also heard this. Although I know several names, I will gather this information; maybe there is something good there. This issue will also be decided soon.

Konya Accepts Nomination as Interior Minister

AU1612095593 Budapest MTI in English 0722 GMT 16 DEC 93

[Text] Budapest, 16 Dec (MTI)—If parliament elects him as prime minister, Peter Boross will not keep the portfolio of interior minister, he said at a Hungarian Democratic Forum Presidium session Wednesday night [15 December].

As his successor, he proposed HDF Parliamentary Group leader Imre Konya. Konya accepted the nomination. Boross said he does not plan any more changes in the government.

Goncz Continues Talks With Parties

AU1512172793 Budapest MTI in English 1511 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Budapest, 15 Dec (MTI)—The Federation of Young Democrats (FYD) would like the president to set the date of elections immediately after appointing the new prime minister, so dispelling related uncertainties, opposition FYD Chairman Viktor Orban told President Arpad Goncz on Wednesday [15 December].

Orban confirmed his party will vote down the nominee not because of Peter Boross personally, but in criticism of the last three years of the government.

The 12 ballots of the Hungarian Justice and Life Party (HJLP) faction will be crucial at parliamentary voting for Antall's successor, HJLP Co-Chairman Istvan Csurka told reporters after his meeting with Goncz.

Regarding desired changes in the next government, Csurka said the HJLP considers Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky unsuitable for his post on account of ratification of the Hungarian-Ukrainian basic treaty, as well as Privatization Minister Tamas Szabo, who "suffered a defeat" in parliament ten times or so. Csurka said, "Szabo would have to be dismissed a long time ago." The party would also like Boross to keep the interior portfolio even if he becomes prime minister.

Csurka stressed his party, as other parties, stands for continuity, but he sees no threat to the country's calm and stability. He believes stability will not be upset if parliament does not approve Boross' nomination, because the only difference will be that the elections may be held a month earlier.

'Constructive Talks' Held

AU1612095393 Budapest MTI in English 1924 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Budapest, 15 Dec (MTI)—Hungarian President Arpad Goncz held what he termed as constructive talks on the nominee for the prime minister's post with leaders of parliamentary parties today, the president's spokesman Andras Farago told MTI today.

Goncz concluded that both the coalition parties and the opposition consider continuity and stability to be prerequisites for solving the problem created by Jozsef Antall's death.

As reported earlier, the president met today with Christian Democratic People's Party Chairman Laszlo Surjan, Federation of Young Democrats Chairman Viktor Orban, Hungarian Justice and Life Party Co-Chairman Istvan Csurka, National Democratic Federation Chairman Imre Pozsgay, and Republic Party Chairman Janos Palotas.

Aware of his responsibility, the president will set the date of the 1994 general elections only after parliament elects a new prime minister, Farago said.

Tommorrow Goncz is scheduled to confer with leaders of the Agrarian Association, the Social Democratic Party, the Democratic Party, the Hungarian Interest Party, the Pensioners' Party, and the Hungarian Market Party, as well as with leaders of the parliamentary party groups.

Foreign Ministry Issues Statement on Drava River

AU1612095193 Budapest MTI in English 2021 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Budapest, 15 Dec (MTI)—Recently some Croatian politicians have said that the 1988 Hungarian-Yugoslav agreement on common utilization of the Drava, a Hungarian-Croatian border river, is still in effect between the two countries. Accordingly, Hungary and Croatia may construct hydroelectric plants on the river. The Hungarian Foreign Ministry, however, holds that the agreement is no longer valid, a ministry official told MTI today.

Referring to international legal practice, the ministry argues that should questions of succession arise, bilateral treaties are only considered effective if the states concerned expressly declare this or imply such conclusion by their attitude.

After Hungary established diplomatic links with Croatia, the two foreign ministries began talks on which Hungarian-Yugoslav agreements should remain in effect between Hungary and Croatia.

Budapest presented a list of agreements to serve as a basis for new agreements. The list did not include the accord on the common utilization of the Drava. Nor did Hungary indicate its willingness to keep the accord in force. Until new agreements are reached, those concluded with former Yugoslavia are suspended.

In a diplomatic note to Croatia on July 14, the Hungarian Foreign Ministry formally declared that it no longer considered the 1988 agreement in effect with regard to Croatia. Simultaneously, Budapest proposed surveying all issues related to the mutually beneficial protection and utilization of the Drava.

The ministry states that the details of the 1988 general agreement should have been worked out in further agreements that were never concluded with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This means that the accord could not be implemented even if the state succession had not happened.

The ministry argues that the Hungarian side always held this view, as was understood during the latest talks with the delegation of the Croatian Ministry of Environmental Protection and Regional Development on December 3.

Walesa: 'Premature' To Comment on Russian Vote

LD1512131893 Warsaw PAP in Polish 1124 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, 15 Dec—At a meeting today in the SZTANDAR MLODYCH editorial office, President Lech Walesa claimed that commenting on the election results in Russia is premature. In the president's view, at least three to four months will pass before the situation in Russia "takes shape". We have to use this time for preparations if there is to be any danger to us arising from the developments, he said.

The president announced that he will not permit the politicization of the Foreign, Defense, and Interior Ministries. Lech Walesa emphasized many times that he is inclined toward building a stable system of democratic power in Poland, which is able to defend itself. If he succeeds, he will probably not stand in the next elections for the highest office in the land.

The president appealed to journalists for greater honesty and responsibility in reporting the situation in the country. At the end of the meeting the SZTANDAR MLODYCH journalists presented the president with a fishing rod.

Olechowski Dubious on Partnership for Peace

LD1512202893 Warsaw Third Program Radio Network in Polish 2000 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Poland has not yet said yes to the American proposal of Partnership for Peace, and will not accept it if it is acknowledged that this program will be a second Yalta or else will close to us the road to NATO, head of Polish diplomacy Minister Andrzej Olechowski, who is on a visit in the United States, has stated.

In the course of a lecture, Olechowski recalled that Poland is pressing for the setting, at the very start of Partnership for Peace, of strict criteria for membership in the North Atlantic Pact. The head of the Polish Ministry of Foreign Affairs also stated that he came to Washington to establish whether the program of Partnership for Peace can help Poland in fulfilling its desires for integration with the west, including NATO, or whether it will lead us out into a dangerous, gray, unclaimed zone. Olechowski, avoiding an evaluation of the plan for Partnership for Peace, said that the U.S. State Department has already accepted the arguments of the Polish side and that they will be taken into account.

Division of Europe Rejected

LD1612005393 Warsaw PAP in English 2205 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Washington, Dec. 15—Poland has not yet agreed to the U.S. "partnership for peace" programme, and will not do so if it appears that "the programme will be a second Yalta, or closes Poland's road to NATO," Polish Foreign Minister Andrzej Olechowski told a press conference in Washington on Wednesday.

Olechowski said that he believed that he saw in the American plan an attempt to remove the division of Europe. He noted the claim of its supporters that partnership was open to all, and that NATO membership was available to all at the end of the partnership process.

Olechowski stressed, however, that Poland would not agree to partnership if this progress towards NATO membership remained cloudy and offered for the sake of peace and quiet, and if there were no guarantee of NATO membership at the end of the process.

Asked whether the proposal represented a new partition of Europe, Olechowski said that "we ought not to say, and cannot, that the plan represents a new partition of Europe."

Earlier Olechowski, during a lecture at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, had presented his five-point "road map" leading to NATO which he would want to add to the "partnership for peace" programme.

He said the programme should clearly envisage a gradual broadening of NATO and include concrete political and military requirements for countries wanting to become NATO members.

According to Olechowski, the mechanism of consultations with NATO in case a partner country, and a candidate for NATO member, is threatened should foresee some kind of joint actions aimed at restoring and maintaining peace and security.

Furthermore, the scope and nature of NATO cooperation with prospective partner-states should depend on the degree of their observance of military procedure and on how far they have gone in building democratic institutions. Finally, all partners for peace should be presented with identical preconditions.

During the speech, Olechowski said that the presence of a democratic and strong Russia is a necessary precondition for the success of any kind of security system.

He warned American supporters of the idea of a "strategic partnership" with Moscow that until Russia transforms itself into a democratic power with a market economy such partnership would not be advantageous to world security.

In his opinion, the U.S. should approach Russia in the same manner as President Truman approached Germany and Japan after World War II. Russia should be made a permanent member of G-7, while the European Union should sign an agreement on broad partnership, said Olechowski.

Olechowski said that Russia, transformed into a democratic power, could become a side to the "new Euroatlantic contract" which would assume the implementation of two goals:

1. NATO membership for "those countries which could not apply for NATO membership in the past for reasons beyond their control and which now share the pacts values, represent a stabilizing factor and want and are able to efficiently contribute to the implementation of the goals of the pact,"

2. "New relations between NATO and Russia, covering issues linked with peace, security and closer economic ties. These relations should lead to strategic partnership with Russia and her closer consolidation with the world economic system."

Commenting on his talks on Tuesday with U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher, Olechowski said that the Polish arguments relating to security proposals in Europe had been noted, and "would be taken into account."

Commenting on the Russian elections at the weekend, Olechowski said that Poland was deeply uneasy regarding the intentions of Vladimir Zhirinovskiy concerning Poland. He expressed disquiet at the apparent territorial claims of the victor, and said that "those politicians will probably behave differently after gaining their seats, but the fact remains that it was the statements they made, and not what they will now do, which gained them their popularity."

Kolodziejczyk Views NATO Entry, Russia

AU1512193693 Poznan WPROST in Polish 12 Dec 93 pp 13, 14

[Interview with Piotr Kolodziejczyk, minister of national defense, by Miroslaw Cielemecki, Marek Krol, and Romuald Strzemiecki; place and date not given: "An Axis of Security"]

[Text] [WPROST] The editor in chief of a French newspaper, hearing how disappointed we were with NATO's reluctance to admit Poland, expressed surprise that the idea of NATO is still fashionable in Poland in view of the fact that the pact is a thing of the past. Should society be told the bitter truth that the United States' interest in Poland's problems is genuinely non-existent?

[Kolodziejczyk] France's defense is based on its own nuclear potential, plus... membership of NATO. Our desire to integrate with the Euroatlantic defense system is not a question of fashion, but the result of our deep conviction about the need to create a new system of security for the whole continent based on a reformed NATO. This is the "bitter truth" that we must tell to a world that is unwilling to perceive the completely new situation in Europe.

[WPROST] You talk of NATO as a relic. Does that mean our attitude toward NATO admission has altered?

[Kolodziejczyk] This might be a rather sharp thing to say, but I think that NATO in its present shape belongs to the past. Unless it undergoes a clear change, this powerful organization's effectiveness will diminish. We want to join a NATO that possesses a new mandate, is open to all interested countries, and constitutes the core of a new system of collective security.

[WPROST] Would Russia, remaining outside NATO, agree to the presence of NATO forces on the other side of its border with Poland? That might be the situation if Poland ever becomes a member.

[Kolodziejczyk] I do not think there is an immediate need to transfer NATO forces to Poland.

[WPROST] But Poland's forces will be NATO forces.

[Kolodziejczyk] I see nothing wrong with that. The problem is that Russia still seems to consider Poland as in a sphere of Russian interests, and still fails to appreciate the aspirations of countries that have finally become independent. On the other hand, Moscow claims that it does not see any potential enemy in NATO, and is prepared for far-reaching cooperation with it. There is something contradictory about all this. If one adds to this the West's great suppliance toward President Yeltsin, the situation becomes even less clear.

[WPROST] We may doubt whether NATO will admit us in our lifetime.

[Kolodziejczyk] We must do all we can to open NATO's eyes.

[WPROST] We are applying for NATO membership at a time when Russia is shaping a new political order. Does the Kremlin view our efforts to join NATO as an anti-Russian move? Would that encourage the emergence of an autocratic system in Russia?

[Kolodziejczyk] I consider such a way of thinking erroneous, and it is not confirmed by any facts. Of course one must bear in mind that after years of intensive propaganda the word "NATO" is still synonymous with evil in Russian society, and it might be used in the pre-election campaign as a way of influencing voters. Let us hope the forthcoming Russian elections will determine the path that Russia will take, and that this path will be positive both for Poland and Russia itself.

[WPROST] Is Russia's admission to NATO at all possible, even theoretically?

[Kolodziejczyk] It is difficult to imagine an effective security system that does not include Russia or, even worse, is directed against Russia. All the countries of our continent must be included in the security mechanisms of the new Europe. When that happens and in what order is a different matter. The "Partnership for Peace" initiative may be the beginning of that process, provided that this idea is more specific. We will soon find out what it involves.

[WPROST] According to the WASHINGTON POST, by agreeing to the "Partnership for Peace" initiative, we

have agreed to hold military exercises on our territory with U.S. and Russian forces.

[Kolodziejczyk] We will be able to say more about this in January, after the NATO summit has accepted the proposal.

[WPROST] But would Russian forces also take part in joint exercises on Polish territory?

[Kolodziejczyk] Why not? Joint exercises with the Russians does not mean a return to the Warsaw Pact.

[WPROST] What about Ukraine?

[Kolodziejczyk] The better our relations with our neighbors, the safer our borders. Apart from that, if we want to integrate with the West, we cannot waste the advantages of economic cooperation with the East, especially with a country as rich in natural resources as Ukraine.

[WPROST] Are you acquainted with Ukraine's new military doctrine?

[Kolodziejczyk] It is being closely examined, like all documents of this type.

[WPROST] Does Poland have a military doctrine?

[Kolodziejczyk] I would say that it does. That is the term we can use to describe all the provisions of state defense policy.

[WPROST] But is that a military doctrine?

[Kolodziejczyk] It is a collection of official views of the subject of the basic provisions of state defense policy.

[WPROST] Knowing that the NATO protective umbrella will not be unfurled over our armed forces soon, what kind of armed forces development concept should we adopt so that our armed forces may fulfill their role in line with Poland's economic capabilities?

[Kolodziejczyk] In order to meet the technical standards obtaining in Western armies, we need considerable sums of money. But most of all we need NATO's openness toward technological cooperation. Regardless of the size of the state defense budget, the sooner we start adapting, the sooner we will achieve the technological standard that will permit cooperation on the battlefield. Even a minimal increase in defense spending, say 3 percent of GNP, would give a boost to our defense industry and permit it to restructure and adapt to new needs. This would also reduce unemployment and cause a revival in other economic spheres.

[WPROST] What can we achieve with 3 percent of GNP?

[Kolodziejczyk] All we can do is keep in touch with modern technology and put a halt to the dangerous dwindling of so-called untouchable reserves.

[WPROST] If the modernization of the army that you are calling for does not occur, how long will it be before we are completely defenseless?

[Kolodziejczyk] Two or three years.

[WPROST] What is the meaning of the talks on the subject of adapting our defense industry products to the standard of the products of third countries, such as the products of Bofors of Sweden or those of Israel?

[Kolodziejczyk] They mean that we are prepared to cooperate with anyone who does not refuse to cooperate with us. NATO is constantly refusing to cooperate.

[WPROST] Robin Baird, NATO assistant secretary general for defense support, clearly stated in Kielce that we should adapt to NATO standards and commence cooperation with the industries of the NATO countries.

[Kolodziejczyk] Exactly. That is what he said.

[WPROST] Do you have the impression that over the past four years our policy has, like a pendulum, swung toward the West, to the exclusion of cooperation with Russia?

[Kolodziejczyk] I hope you are not accusing me of anything. I am not the one who shaped Polish foreign policy. We have made certain overtures toward the East, but our political contacts have been very shallow. The careless haste in dismantling CEMA has affected not just the army. Apart from causing chaos, the sudden change in the rules has caused losses amounting to trillions of zlotys, in industry as well.

[WPROST] Are we completely free to do such things as redeploy our forces nearer the eastern border?

[Kolodziejczyk] Without a doubt. If the need arises, the redeployment of the relevant forces will take place. We are a sovereign state.

[WPROST] So what moves should we make in our efforts to get accepted into the modernized NATO?

[Kolodziejczyk] If Russia begins to build a democratic system, many of the issues that now disturb us will lose their meaning. Should totalitarianism return, which cannot be ruled out, the danger to our eastern border will rise. We need a joint system of European security in order to counteract such a difficult eventuality.

[WPROST] Some people claim that in Malta in 1989, Mikhail Gorbachev and George Bush again divided Europe into spheres of influence, and that it was not the military men who persuaded Yeltsin to withdraw his support for Poland's NATO entry; it was Clinton who demanded that the Russian president confirm the present status quo.

[Kolodziejczyk] No comment.

[WPROST] Do you agree that we are in the Russian sphere of influence?

[Kolodziejczyk] There is no doubt that we are within the Russian sphere of interests. Somehow this is confirmed by the new Russian military doctrine, which discusses, for example, the not-further-explained concept of "foreign territory immediately beyond Russia." The Russian military doctrine contains more such ambiguous terms. Let us hope this is just a document that belongs to the present transitional period in which the old way of thinking is still rife, and that this document will be amended in line with the democratization of life in Russia. But I fear that this change will be a long and difficult process, in fact quite an impossible process unless Russia clearly cooperates with the rest of Europe.

[WPROST] What kind of strategic thinking should we adopt in our relations with Russia in order to be prepared for any eventuality?

[Kolodziejczyk] Do you imagine we could a win a war against Russia?

[WPROST] How much time do we have before the worst scenario materializes?

[Kolodziejczyk] History may give us very little time—two or three months, let us say. One will be able to say more on this subject after the December elections.

[WPROST] In the new world situation, can we not follow the path taken by, for instance, Austria or Finland?

[Kolodziejczyk] Austria was never within the Russian sphere of interests. The strategy of the Russians leads westward, and that is the direction in which our country lies. The problem is to make this an axis of cooperation, not of expansion.

[WPROST] Does the Russian military doctrine maintain that none of Russia's western neighbors, except Turkey, should belong to NATO?

[Kolodziejczyk] I think that this is what the Russians are suggesting, and the West agrees to this thinking without any criticism.

Frasyniuk on Democratic Union's Alliances

PM1512161493 Krakow CZAS KRAKOWSKI in Polish 27-28 Nov 93 p 6

[Interview with Democratic Union deputy chairman Wladyslaw Frasyniuk by correspondent Amelia Lukasiak; date, place not given]

[Excerpts] [Lukasiak] As recently as a few months ago you were declaring—together with Bronislaw Geremek—your readiness to cooperate with the postcommunists from the Democratic Left Alliance [SLD]. How do you assess these declarations now, after they won a victory in the election back in September?

[Frasyniuk] The SLD's victory was based mainly on their earlier efforts to win the public's sympathy when they were still confined to their own ghetto and wore the dunce's cap. We have this interesting phenomenon in Poland whereby people who are successful do not receive much public support, whereas those who suffer, do. During the martial law years everyone commiserated with those who were imprisoned and persecuted. Just as Tadeusz Mazowiecki, who nearly collapsed in a faint while addressing parliament from the Sejm rostrum, still stirs in us tremendous reserves of sympathy and affection, so the SLD, which was at one time seen as being subjected to harsh persecution, could persist for a long time in an attitude of total opposition without giving any obvious signs of intending to assume even the slightest responsibility for the affairs of the state. The Democratic Union believed that the SLD should be shaken out of that state of blissful self-approval. We managed to achieve that to a considerable degree on the occasion of the debate on the privatization bill. I believe that if we had done it earlier, we would not have been so surprised by the election results.

[Lukasiak] Do you see any other reasons for the SLD's election victory?

[Frasyniuk] The new regime failed to carry out a comprehensive and clear appraisal of the previous period. As a result, people gradually came to believe that the country's factories, schools, education system, etc., could be wholly credited as the previous system's positive achievements. During the 1989-90 period we never got the expected report on the condition of the country's economy, culture, education, or health service.

[Lukasiak] Who should have prepared that report?

[Frasyniuk] In my opinion, our own governments should have done it. It was one of Mazowiecki's mistakes that it was not done. People need that kind of "rite of passage." In our case, the transition from one system to another was too blurred at the edges. Even today it is still obvious that people do not distinguish clearly between the two epochs. I would say more: They are actually under the impression that all our misfortunes began after 1989.

[Lukasiak] Could that erroneous view have been corrected?

[Frasyniuk] No. After the rise of sharp conflicts within Solidarity and when the anticommunist and revindicationist rhetoric began to dominate its vision, the kind of "audit report" on the previous regime would have been tantamount to passing judgment and sentence on specific persons and specific milieus.

[Lukasiak] Did you aim to provoke a rift between Borowski and Miller?

[Frasyniuk] No. I was interested in seeing that the SLD ceased to be such a monolithic bloc and ceased to act as the perpetual opposition which can get away with everything and anything. Their policy of isolation is to be blamed for causing the defeat of the Polish right-wing orientation. In my opinion, the right is not going to

recover from that defeat for a long time. They think exclusively in terms of anticommunist rhetoric. [passage omitted]

[Lukasiak] The head of the Parliamentary Women's Group [Barbara Labuda] has proposed you for the next Democratic Union chairman.

[Frasyniuk] Well, first of all let us say that that was a demonstration of a local, Wroclaw patriotism on her part. Second, I have worked with Barbara Labuda since August 1980. We have not always agreed in our political views, but looking back on our cooperation I believe that the similarities in our positions outweigh our differences. We have very similar political temperaments, which can complement each other brilliantly during revolutionary upheavals, but are rather difficult to reconcile in peaceful coexistence.

[Lukasiak] What is your position on entering into alliance with the Liberal Democratic Congress [KLD]?

[Frasyniuk] I am a fervent advocate of union with the KLD. I even blame myself for being unable to encourage more effective and consistent cooperation and dialogue concerning economic matters between the KLD, the Polish Economic Accord [PPG], and the Democratic Union during the previous political season.

[Lukasiak] The 15-percent support which you received—jointly with the KLD—in the last election is too little to hope to exert much influence on the running of the country. Will the Democratic Union continue to seek political partners, and if so, on which side of the political stage will it look for them?

[Frasyniuk] The Democratic Union is a very liberal party both in economic and ideological matters. You seek partners wherever you hope to find them. To put it bluntly—and this is the subject of my argument with Rokita—it is not worth investing in those old VIPs who were prominent on the previous political teams. We must be open to the electorate on both the right and the left side of the political stage. If an analysis was made after the last election examining the shifts in voters' sympathies, I believe we would have found that we had lost some 30 percent of our supporters to the right-wing orientation and the same amount to the left. We should now make every effort to win them back.

Coalition Wants Role in Work of Key Ministries

AU1612101593 Warsaw PAP in English 1819 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 15—Deputies Aleksander Kwasniewski of the Democratic Left Alliance (SLD) and Janusz Piechocinski of the Polish Peasant Party (PSL) said that the ruling coalition should be able to intervene in the work of the interior, foreign and defence ministries.

Commenting on a statement by the president to the effect that he will not allow these ministries to be politicized, the leaders of the two coalition parties said that it is unacceptable for the government coalition not to be able to intervene in the work of so important ministries.

"The president is a little bored with the stability in Poland and he is looking for new points of contention," Kwasniewski observed.

A few days ago the SLD and PSL announced they would appoint one deputy minister of the two parties to the three presidential ministries.

Kwasniewski said that the "coalition wants to have its representatives in the authorities of these ministries. It is not so that there is the Pawlak government and three presidential ministries. This is a coalition government led by Waldemar Pawlak, and the defence, interior and foreign ministers are members of the government. Their nominations were consulted with the Belvedere. The president is unnecessarily showing such greed now."

Piechocinski stressed that the coalition parties are not questioning the fact that the role of the president is to shape foreign, defence and state security policies. "We see here an enormous field for cooperation between the coalition, parliament and the president."

Solidarity Makes Economic Demands

AU1612112593 Warsaw PAP in English 1935 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Gdansk, Dec. 15—The Presidium of the Solidarity National Commission demanded a full indexation of old age and disability pensions in 1994 at its meeting here today. In its postulate, addressed to the government, the Solidarity National Executive termed the government's draft law on pension valorization "an attempt at avoiding the reform of the pension system."

The two-day meeting of the Presidium, which ended today, also passed a negative opinion on the government draft law on wages in the public sector in 1994.

According to the union, the proposed increase in wages for public sector employees of 2 percent above next year's inflation rate is too modest, especially in view of the decline in real wages recorded in recent years.

Solidarity also demanded that the government stick to its promise (made earlier this year) that any extra budget income be allocated for wage increases in education, health service and culture.

Finally, the Solidarity Presidium called on the government to formally declare all saturdays free from work. This would close a loophole in regulations and bring legislation into line with reality, the union executive said.

Wages Outstrip Prices in November

LD1512231493 Warsaw PAP in English 2030 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Warsaw, Dec. 15—The average monthly wage in November in the six basic sectors of the Polish economy was 4,634,125 zlotys (about 230 dollars), 7.5 percent higher than in October, the Central Statistical Office (GUS) reported on Wednesday.

By contrast, the price of goods and services in November was 4 percent higher than in October.

The Central Statistical Office also reported that the financial situation of Polish enterprises over the first ten months of 1993 was significantly better than in the same period of 1992. The profitability ratio for Polish enterprises during the period in question was 4 percent, compared with 3.2 percent for the analogous period in 1992, and 2.2 percent for the whole of 1992.

Foreign Ministry Wants 'Fair Trial' for Ilascu

AU1512172993 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1516 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bucharest, ROMPRES, 15/12/1993—At the Foreign Ministry's weekly press conference, Spokeswoman Simona Miculescu said that Romania's efforts that the sentence pronounced against "the Ilascu group" by the mock court in Tiraspol be nullified, had been promptly replied as a current of opinion appeared, asking for a fair trial and the rescuing of Ilie Ilascu's life.

Referring to the Foreign Minister Teodor Melescanu's visit to Washington, starting on Wednesday, December 15, the spokeswoman presented the agenda of the visit including interviews with American businessmen, the signing of the protocol concerning the exchange of the ratification instruments of the bilateral treaty on mutual protection of investments, talks with the American Secretary of State Warren Christopher and with his assistant for Europe and Canada Stephen Oxman, a new round of discussions with assistants of the U.S.-Aid administrator, with Pentagon Undersecretary for Political Affairs Frank Wisner, with President Clinton's National Security Counselor Anthony Lake, with the president of the Committee for Enforcing the Sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, with the president of the UN Security Council, the assistant UN secretary-general for peace-keeping operations. The Romanian foreign minister is scheduled to meet on the last day of his visit with members of the Romanian diaspora in the United States.

The Foreign Ministry spokesman referred also to the recent activities of the Romanian diplomacy. Romania was admitted as member of the technical and cultural cooperation agency, the spokeswoman informed. This membership would enable Romania to participate in the cooperation programs, even through own projects to be executed in Romania with financial participation of the agency. This was the first important Romanian participation after Romania's official joining in the Francophone movement.

With regard to the consultations between the Foreign Ministries of Romania and Poland on December 14, the spokeswoman said that Romanian Secretary of State Ion Gorita and Polish Secretary of State Iwo Byczewski had reviewed the current stage and the prospects of the bilateral relations and had exchanged opinions on major issues of the present international situation. The two officials had exchanged on the occasion the ratification instruments of the treaty on friendly relations and cooperation between Romania and Poland and of the Romanian-Polish consular convention signed in Bucharest on January 25, 1993, the Foreign Ministry spokeswoman said.

Nastase Views Results of Visit to China

AU1512165293 Bucharest ROMPRES in English 1502 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bucharest ROMPRES, 15/12/1993—The Romanian parliamentary delegation which made a ten-day visit in China came back to Bucharest on Wednesday, 15 December. At the Otopeni airport, the head of the delegation, Chamber of Deputies Speaker Adrian Nastase outlined the results of the visit.

"We had the opportunity to notice the extraordinary changes occurred in China at an economic level. I want to give a single example: Shenzhen is a settlement established not earlier than 15 years ago and now it competes with Hong Kong or any other of these young 'tigers' of the Pacific," Nastase said.

"We have observed that people work extraordinarily hard there, that a very clear order of priorities and targets exists. We discussed the possibilities of strengthening the political and economic cooperation between Romania and China. We planned various actions at a parliamentary level and we tried to find out as much as possible about the legislation in China concerning the establishment of these fields for experiments of new ideas: The special economic zones, the free trade zones where new and efficient patterns are sought in order to allure foreign capital," Nastase said.

Daily Views 'Risky' Implications of IMF Accord

AU1512161993 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 10 Dec 93 p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "A Risky Commitment of Vacaroiu's Government"]

[Text] A "letter of intent" from the Romanian Government to the IMF was signed yesterday [9 December] at Victoria Palace in Bucharest. Worked out after 10 months of difficult negotiations, which were even marked by certain moments of suspense, the document summarizes the economic measures that the Romanian Government pledges to undertake in the coming period in return for receiving a substantial loan from the IMF. These measures, which are detailed in a separate document—the Romanian Government's Memorandum—also signed yesterday, envisage, among other things, the following: eliminating subsidies for unprofitable industrial giants; accelerating the restructuring and privatization processes; promoting monetary and fiscal austerity; and liberalizing the leu's exchange rate. On careful reading, these measures, to which the Nicolae Vacaroiu government commits itself in writing, immediately arouse what Gelu Voican-Voiculescu [former deputy prime minister] would call a profound state of perplexity. The presidential and parliamentary elections were dominated by the campaign against reform led by Ion Iliescu and the Social Democracy Party of Romania [PDSR]. All the hardships of daily life until then were blamed on the reformist economic measures of the Petre

Roman and Theodor Stolojan governments. The PDSR's and Ion Iliescu's allies—the Romanian National Unity Party [PUNR], the Socialist Party of Labor [PSM], and the Greater Romania Party [PRM]—took an even tougher attitude toward reform. The leaders of these parties did not refrain from calling it "criminal," in violent contradiction with national interests," or "dictated by imperialist circles abroad." By taking to task the reformist measures of the previous governments, all the parties making up the current governmental coalition firmly pledged to promote a slower pace in the reform process and even bring it to a standstill. In this way, they promised that unemployment would disappear, prices would no longer rise, and wages would keep increasing. In being honest with themselves and, particularly, with the electorate, the opposition parties advocated reformist economic programs in the election campaign and tried hard to convince the population that there was no other way out of the crisis and that the reality of the Romanian economy required drastic measures of austerity in the coming period. Blaming the hardships of daily life not on bungled reform, but on reform as such, the population took the promises of the left-wing parties and of Ion Iliescu seriously. The PDSR, PUNR, PSM, and PRM formed a coalition that has been running Romania for more than a year. In all this time, criticism of the reform process has not ceased for one moment. Certain reformist measures, such as the cut in subsidies and the introduction of value-added tax, were taken under compulsion and without conviction. Left-wing slogans kept being constantly promulgated from Cotroceni [presidential palace] or the Victoria Palace [seat of government]. However, with this letter of intent, Romania's government pledges to take certain economic measures in the coming period that are so radically reformist in nature that even a right-wing government might hesitate in adopting them. With a simple stroke of the pen, a left-wing government has turned into a right-wing one. There are two possible explanations for this bizarre phenomenon. The first relates to a typical feature of the team that came to power after December 1989. President Ion Iliescu and Nicolae Vacaroiu's government may think that they can adopt the same policy toward the IMF as that adopted toward the Council of Europe. A policy that, put in simple terms, might be expressed as follows: We say as they say and do as we want! If the current power really thought like that, the consequences could be disastrous. There is no doubt that the IMF will strictly oversee the way in which the government implements the commitment it has assumed through the letter of intent. At the slightest deviation, we run the risk of having drastic sanctions imposed upon us. Another explanation is the likelihood that Ion Iliescu and Nicolae Vacaroiu's government have sincerely committed themselves to profound and spectacular reform. Although such a possibility is harder to swallow, given the fact that fundamental changes in politics do not occur overnight, the practical implementation of the reformist economic measures outlined in the letter of intent incurs some serious risks. At the news conference that followed the signing ceremony, Maxwell Watson, head of the IMF delegation, insistently pointed out that the economic program outlined in the letter of intent was a program of the Romanian Government, not the IMF. That clarification was not at all a casual one. The economic measures to which the Romanian Government has pledged itself will strongly affect the people's living standard for some time to come. Through Maxwell Watson's statement, the IMF wants to wash its hands in the face of such a prospect. It is obvious that the implementation of the economic measures outlined in the letter of intent presupposes that the current power will show the voters that it fooled them during the September 1992 elections.

Reports on Vacaroiu's Ties With PRM Analyzed

AU1612074893 Bucharest EVENIMENTUL ZILEI in Romanian 13 Dec p 1

[Ion Cristoiu editorial: "Nicolae Vacaroiu's Ties With Greater Romania Party Have Been Made Public"]

[Text] Romanian Television surprised us on Saturday night [11 December] with a detailed report on the participation of a government delegation, headed by Nicolae Vacaroiu, in the proceedings of the National Council of the Greater Romania Party [PRM]. Considering the history of the last decades, the images shown on the screen were no novelty. We all remember how Romanian television and radio used to report on Nicolae Ceausescu's participation in the proceedings of the many national councils and national committees, which were established in order to create the illusion of a democracy that was beyond the limits of a communist regime. Just like Nicolae Ceausescu, upon entering the hall, Premier Nicolae Vacaroiu was welcomed with enthusiastic applause and mainly with misty eyes full of admiring love. Just like Nicolae Ceausescu, Premier Nicolae Vacaroiu made an lengthy speech that was followed by participants with particular interest. As a sign of this state of mind, some people in the hall were busily jotting down notes of the precious ideas and recommendations made by the speaker in their writing pads opened precisely for this purpose. It is true that on such occasions Nicolae Ceausescu did not have the habit of keeping his hand deeply immersed in the pockets of his trousers. But, taking into consideration Nicolae Vacaroiu's position, his habit can be regarded as a sign that he has not yet reached the position of Romanian Communist Party secretary general.

From the point of view of the last year's Romanian political activity, the images broadcast on television are a novelty. This is the first time since the September 1992 elections that the prime minister, accompanied by people with resounding names in his cabinet, has participated in the national council of a party. Thus, Nicolae Vacaroiu's less than usual act will go down in the biography of our fragile democracy. This is a perfectly explicable thing. First of all, because contrary to the proceedings of a congress or of a conference, the proceedings of a national council are dominated by a profound working atmosphere. The participation of the

prime minister in the council confers a certain festive character on the meeting, which is in complete contrast with the "kitchen cabinet" atmosphere of the meeting. Second, because so far, Premier Nicolae Vacaroiu has avoided as far as he could making public his ties with the PSM [Socialist Party of Labor] and with the PSM. Certainly, it was to be suspected that there is a close relationship between him and these parties. It was not accidental that in the publications of the PRM and PSM, the amount of eulogies devoted to Nicolae Vacaroiu visibly exceed the hymns sang to Ion Iliescu. If in both publications, namely VREMEA and ROMANIA MARE one can still find from time to time a small caustic remark published about the president, about Nicolae Vacaroiu one can hear only the sounds of a permanent ode of joy. This connection was so well hidden that one could certainly believe that Premier Nicolae Vacaroiu considered it to be shameful. Now, through his participation in the meeting and the speech made during the proceedings of the PRM National Council, the affair has been made public.

The press has recently widely circulated the idea that President Ion Iliescu is busily working for the fall of the current government and for its replacement with a government that might exclude the nationalist-extremist parties. Such a conclusion was reached on the basis of the assumption that Ion Iliescu is aware of an indisputable truth: The economic measures promised through the letter of intent to the IMF by the Romanian Government cannot be implemented under conditions in which the executive power relies on such parties as the PRM and the PSM, parties that are categorically against the radical reform that has to be carried out in exchange for the dollars that are about to come from Washington. A government based on a different parliamentary majority, that is, a majority clearly in favor of reforms, would be the only one capable of promoting the measures requested by the IMF without the risk of transforming the dissatisfaction of the population into a violent reform. In fact, this is what the recent student and trade union movements are also demanding. However, Nicolae Vacaroiu's participation in the proceedings of the PRM National Council shows us that the information and the rumors regarding the change of tune at the Cotroceni [Presidency] are exclusively the product of an intoxication through the press, carried out within the framework of a broader process of easing social tension through diversion and an act of undermining the unity and determination of the opposition by pretending that the leadership has become weaker. No doubt an act like that of Nicolae Vacaroiu could not have been made without the Cotroceni's approval. The fact that the president accepted the disclosure of the shameful relationship between the government and the PRM shows us that, for the coming period, no divorce of the PDSR [Social Democracy Party of Romania] from the PRM and the PSM can be expected but, on the contrary, a strengthening of the current governmental coalition. God only knows with what consequences to the social life!

Army Promotions Announced; HVO Units Merged

AU1512141793 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 0900 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] At the session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina held yesterday, the following people were promoted to the rank of brigadier general: Enver Hadzihasanovic, Stjepan Siber, Jovan Divjak, Mustafa Hajrulahovic, Sulejman Vran, Meho Karisik, Vahid Karavelic, Kasim Zabic, Ramiz Drekovic, Arif Pasalic, and (Bismo Suljevic).

At the suggestion of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, the Presidency bestowed titles of honor to the following units for extraordinary results shown in battle:

The title of chivalrous was bestowed upon the Zvornik 206th Hill Brigade of the 2d Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army; the Maglaj 201st Hill Brigade of the 2d Corps; the Tesanj 202d Brigade of the 2d Corps, formerly called the Famous Sooty; and the Buzim 205th Hill Brigade of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

The title of Famous is bestowed upon the Sarajevo 1st Motorized Brigade of the 1st Corps; the [word indistinct] 1st Hill Brigade [words indistinct]; the Teocak [words indistinct] of the 2nd Corps; the Olovo 1st Hill Brigade of the 2d Corps; the Gornji Vakuf 317th Hill Brigade of the 3d Corps; the Doboj 203d Motorized Brigade of the 2d Corps; the Teslic 204th Hill Brigade of the 2d Corps; the Croatian Defense Council [HVO] 110th Hill Brigade, the former Croatian Defense Council Usora 110th Brigade; and the Bosanska Krupa 511th Brigade of the 5th Corps of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

At the session of the Presidency of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, and at the suggestion of the Staff of the Supreme Command of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was decided that units of the HVO which have participated in the defense of the republic together with the [Bosnia-Herzegovina] Army in the past period of time should change their names and that they should join the Army of Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Izetbegovic Congratulates Generals

AU1512200693 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Report by Stevo Latinovic]

[Text] [Latinovic] The seven brigadier generals promoted yesterday were today received by President of the Presidency Alija Izetbegovic. He received them in the presence of Presidency members Dr. Tatjana Ljuic-Mijatovic, Nijaz Durakovic, Mirko Pejanovic, Stjepan Kljuic, and Miro Lazovic, chairman of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Assembly. Attending were Stjepan Siber, Jovan Divjak, Mustafa Hajrulahovic Talijan, Sulejman Vran, Vahid Karavelic, Arif Pasalic, and Ramiz Drekovic. The other generals and Rasim Delic, commander of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army, did not attend due to urgent tasks in the field. Addressing the first brigadier generals, President Izetbegovic said:

[Izetbegovic] I have summoned you to present yourselves to the Presidency so that they can be introduced to you. Most of you they already know. Unfortunately, not all of you are present; a number of you are currently out in the field, on the front lines; the commander of the General Staff is also out in the field; he left yesterday night for central Bosnia to attend to some urgent business there; part of it has to do with the convoy whose arrival needs to be coordinated.

I would like to use this occasion to [words indistinct] on behalf of the Presidency, to wish you much success in this struggle, so that we can welcome freedom, maintain Bosnia-Herzegovina, save our peoples, and speed up our struggle, our struggle for liberation, so that it may end as soon as possible with as few casualties as possible. Therefore, I am glad that I can congratulate you on behalf of the Presidency [words indistinct].

[Latinovic] General Stjepan Siber thanked Presidency President Alija Izetbegovic on behalf of the newly promoted brigadier generals. Mr. Siber, you thanked the president and the Presidency members and your grateful command, and you made some promises.

[Siber] I sincerely told the Presidency members that being a soldier in the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army is an honor for me and for my friends, to be a soldier in a state that is defending itself and fighting for the freedom of its people. Moreover, I said that every soldier should respect a promotion bestowed by our army, regardless of what it is, regardless of its name, and its rank, particularly when one is promoted to a general, as we were. Such a person must, regardless of where he is, on whatever front, in the country or abroad, validate this trust and try to use his rank—for as long as he lives—to fight for Bosnia-Herzegovina, for the people's freedom. I promised on behalf of my friends who were received by the president and the Presidency that we would do everything to liberate our country as soon as possible, and that we would do everything to maintain the combat readiness and the morale of our units at as high a level as possible. To put it succinctly, I promised we would remain reliable fighters for our state.

[Latinovic] The act of promotion to brigadier general is more proof that we can and must count on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army. Today and in the future. We can count on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army and the Bosnia-Herzegovina people whom the Army is defending. The aggressor must also count on the Bosnia-Herzegovina Army.

Ministry Issues Statement on Ganic's Egypt Trip

AU1512210293 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Ejub Ganic, member of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Presidency, yesterday met with and held extensive talks with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak in Cairo. A statement by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Ministry states that Dr. Ganic acquainted the Egyptian president with the situation in our country, the continued aggression, and the Geneva negotiations held so far. He asked friendly Egypt to provide greater and more versatile help in ending the aggression and in achieving a just peace.

Expounding on the unprincipled and inefficient attitude of the international community, Husni Mubarak stressed that any solution that forcefully expels Bosniaks from their homes and places them in areas isolated from mutual communication will not bring peace in the Balkans and could be the main reason for unrest in the Islamic community, particularly in those countries where the United States and Europe have great political and economic interests.

Ejup Ganic also met with Arab League Secretary General 'Abd-al-Majid, who promised that the issue of Bosnia-Herzegovina would always be one of the main topics of this association until a just peace is achieved in Bosnia-Herzegovina. This is stated in the statement issued by the Bosnia-Herzegovina Foreign Ministry.

Krajisnik Comments on 9 Dec Sarajevo Talks

AU1512161393 Belgrade VECERNJE NOVOSTI in Serbo-Croatian 11 Dec 93 p 5

[M. Markovic report on an interview with Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the Bosnian Serb Assembly; place and date not given: "Muslims Only North of Molunat"]

[Text] The meeting with conference Cochairmen Owen and Stoltenberg in Belgrade took place, as had been agreed, to examine the possibility of resuming the negotiations and establish precisely when that can happen. Both our and the Muslim teams are supposed to prepare specific proposals for the continuation of negotiations. That was why I had negotiations with [Prime Minister of Bosnia-Herzegovina Haris] Silajdzic for two days.

This is how Momcilo Krajisnik, chairman of the assembly of the Serbian republic, commented especially for our newspaper on the meeting with Owen and Stoltenberg held in Belgrade the day before yesterday [9 December]. As no solution was found after two days of talks with Silajdzic, so the Serbian negotiation team had nothing new to offer to the cochairmen, and it was agreed for a meeting of representatives of the warring sides to be held after 25 December.

"I want to express my pleasure over the objectivity that the cochairmen demonstrated in Belgrade the day before yesterday," Krajisnik said.

"I cannot say that the talks at Sarajevo airport were unsuccessful, but it was obvious that the Serbian side was confronted with great difficulties," Krajisnik went on to say. "Even despite Silajdzic's hard stance, one nevertheless gets the impression that he too wants the question of borders to be solved as soon as possible."

[Markovic] What are the latest demands by the Muslim side?

[Krajisnik] Silajdzic insisted in particular on concessions in the region of Jajce, Srbobran [Serbian name for Donji Vakuf], as well as a part of the Kupres Commune. They also insist on having the territories along the Una River toward Sanski Most and Prijedor, and demand links between Srebrenica and Kalesija and Srebrenica and Gorazde. As a part of this demand, they also pointed to the region of Ustikolina toward Foca, as well as the region of Bratunac.

[Markovic] Sarajevo was also discussed.

[Krajisnik] We examined the question of Sarajevo in detail and Silajdzic was of the opinion that Sarajevo should be discussed only after the global Bosnia-Herzegovina problem has been solved. He also suggests that the solution proposed in the peace package—that Sarajevo be under a UN protectorate—should be accepted. We also discussed the Neretva Valley and we demanded that the Serbs should be given the right to have a part of it, as 45,000 Serbs used to live there. The question of the sea was also in the focus of the airport meeting. We consulted experts about that matter and concluded that the part of the coast near Montenegro close to Poljice, that is, the stretch from Molunat to Prevlaka, should belong to the Serbs. According to what we were talking about, the Muslims would be given a part to the north of us. Also discussed was Muslim access to the sea in the Neum region, something they will discuss separately with the Croats.

[Markovic] What role did President Milosevic play?

[Krajisnik] He made a great contribution to these talks. His role was such that he in fact represented the entire Serbian arena as united. [sentence as published]

Commentary Views Croatian Policy on Neum Issue

AU1612084593 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Semso Tucakovic commentary]

[Text] The Croatian leaders, and Franjo Tudjman himself, have lately been saying that Croatia would not give Neum to Bosnia as if this were a commune in Zagorje or Istria, and not a part of the neighboring, independent, and internationally recognized state. They claim that they will fight with all available means to stop the Bosnia-Herzegovina Republic from having its window to

the world on the Neum part of the sea, because this is allegedly a historical Croatian area.

[Word indistinct] Croatian nationalist historians have taken to explaining this political nonsense, because they value the opinion of the Croatian leader more than true historical facts. Actually, the real truth is that Neum has never in history been a part of the Croatian state, while it has been part of Bosnia for almost a full three centuries, or more precisely, since 1699, when the Karlovac Peace Treaty established the western borders of the Bosnian province [Bosanski pasaluk]. Prior to this peace, Bosnia—first as an independent state and then as a Turkish province—had extended deep into present Croatian areas. Historians know that, for long periods of time, Makarska, Knin, Split, Imotski, and other areas had been part of Bosnia. Regardless of this, no one in Bosnia wants to use these historical facts to justify territorial aspirations toward Croatia.

The issue of Neum is proof that history is just an excuse when it comes to official Croatian policy toward Bosnia-Herzegovina. Tudjman began the process of integrating this town on the Bosnia- Herzegovina sea exactly two years ago, at the time of the Chetnik attacks on Dubrovnik and the approach of the Greater Serbian forces toward Peljesac via Popovo Polje. At the time, two armies—the Chetnik and the Croatian armies—fought on the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The Muslims from the Neum hinterland flocked into the ranks of the Croatian National Guard, because they were promising freedom and that they would depart as soon as the Serbian and Montenegrin aggressors were expelled. Through mutual efforts, the Chetniks were driven back to Bancici and Argud, but the newcomers from Split, Zadar, and Zagreb did not leave, and their numbers did not decrease, if anything, they swelled continuously.

The Croatian occupier replaced the Serbo-Montenegrin one. The Neum Muslims were the first to realize its nature and intentions. As far back as December 1991, Muslim villages in the Neum hinterland were torched, while numerous families from Tucakovici, Hajdarevici, Sefa, and other villages were exiled [protjerane u muhaderuk]. The appetite of the supreme commander in Zagreb grew. After Neum, his forces captured the old town of Stolac, Caplinja, and now they are relentlessly shelling Mostar, Jablanica, Konjic, Gornji Vakuf, and other cities. The concept of conquering parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina for Croatia, which was initiated in Neum two years ago, is being relentlessly and mercilessly carried our even now. The latest statements of Franjo Tudjman and the Croatian officials about the alleged historical right are just an expression of a policy that obviously does not choose means for its realization. That is why we need to start toppling this concept of conquest precisely with the issue of Neum. Success will annihilate the majority of effects achieved so far by Croatia's aggression against our country.

Muslims Continue Attacks on Serb Positions

LD1512173693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1707 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Bratunac, Zvornik, Dec 15 (TANJUG)—Moslem forces in the war-devastated ex-Yugoslav republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina on Wednesday continued fierce attacks on Serb positions, Bosnian Serb military sources told TANJUG on Wednesday.

The Moslems are attacking the Serb-held parts of Sarajevo and its surrounding suburbs. On Wednesday morning they launched an artillery attack on civilian facilities in Ilidza, near Sarajevo, and shelled the centre of this suburb, its apartment houses and other civilian facilities. The population of Ilildza has fled to shelters, but there were no casualties, the Bosnian Serb army said. The Moslem artillery attack also focused on Ilijas, a suburb to the west of Sarajevo.

The Moslems attacked the area of Butmir, while Moslem snipers fired on Zlatiste, Vrace and Grbavica-Sarajevo suburbs controlled by the Serbs. Tuesday's Moslem attack on Grbavica seriously wounded seven people, the Bosnian Serb military sources said on Wednesday.

Also recorded were fierce Moslem attacks on settlements in the vicinity of Doboj, northern Bosnia. So far it is not known whether there have been any casualties.

The Moslems are attacking Serb positions on Mounts Igman and Bjelasnica from areas from which the U.N. troops have withdrawn. They also launched attacks from zones still controlled by the U.N. Protection Force (UNPROFOR) which did not prevent the attacks, the Bosnian Serb military sources said. Moslem attacks were renewed in the region of Brcko, northern Bosnia.

In Wednesday's attacks on Serb villages in the region of Zvornik, the Moslems once again employed banned chemical weapons—shells with chlorine heads, the Bosnian Serb sources said.

In reaction to Moslem attacks in the region of Gorazde, eastern Bosnia, the commander of the Herzegovina Corps, Vlado Spremo, told TANJUG that the Moslems want to activate the "green transfersal," i.e. a route linking Gorazde and Sandzak (region in Serbia) with Turkey.

In all fronts, the Moslems are increasingly using heavy armaments which is arriving from the Islamic and other countries. Many experts believe that the frontal Moslem attacks on the Serb positions and settlements only confirm that the Moslems are preparing a large-scale offensive ahead of the continuation of the Geneva peace talks scheduled for December 21, the Bosnian Serbs said.

Attacks in Sarajevo Continue

LD1612150193 Belgrade TANJUG Domestic Service in Serbo-Croatian 1253 GMT 16 Dec 93

[Text] Sarajevo, 16 Dec (TANJUG)—The fighting on the Sarajevo front, where Muslim forces have for several days been trying to threaten Serb defense lines by sudden onslaughts from several directions, shows no signs of abating.

According to Serb sources, throughout the night forces loyal to Alija Izetbegovic had as their target positions of the Vogosca operative group of the Army of the Serb Republic [VSR] which late last night repelled an attack by Muslim units deployed at Brijesce Polje.

The strategic line on Zuc, Ugljesici, and the Pretis factory and the center of Vogosca came under fire from heavy and light artillery weapons.

Fighting continued throughout the night on localities east and southeast of Rajlovac. About 0800 this morning the Serb army succeeded in taking the edge off attacks by Muslim forces but sporadic mortar and infantry fire continued throughout the morning.

On the northern section of Sarajevo front along the Ilijas defense lines Muslim forces have been attacking from the direction of Kralup, Visocica, and Salkanov Han. At the same time there is evidence of fresh Muslim forces arriving from Breza. Serb military sources did not say if there were any casualties in the fighting overnight.

Serbs Shell Tuzla Industrial Zone; Risks Noted

AU1612152493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Dec 93

[Excerpt] Several times today Tuzla was exposed to howitzer fire by the chetniks from Mt. Majevica. The industrial zone was targeted, and the region in and around the city. Salih Brkic reports.

[Begin Brkic recording] In their attacks on Tuzla the chetniks have been using howitzers and tanks, in defiance of all the observers and warnings of a possible ecological catastrophe if the deadly reservoirs with poisonous chemical agents are hit. [passage omitted]

Serbs Destroyed Last Mosques in Banja Luka

AU1612155493 Sarajevo Radio Bosnia-Herzegovina Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 16 Dec 93

[Text] The last two mosques in Banja Luka have been blown up by Karadzic's Serbs, UNHCR spokeswoman Alenka Lisinski said in Zagreb.

Mrs. Lisinski said that six explosions resounded through Banja Luka during the night and then the last two mosques, which were already damaged, were razed to the ground. Early this morning trucks arrived at the site of the explosions and towed away the rubble, which was all that remained of the destroyed mosques. Alenka Lisinski said that all the mosques in Banja Luka have now been destroyed, and that 98 percent of the Catholic churches have also been destroyed.

The UN officials who went to the scene of this criminal act were briefly detained by the so-called Serb authorities, news agencies report.

Tudjman Receives Delegation of Sarajevo Croats

LD1612035393 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 2100 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] Republic of Croatia President Franjo Tudjman today received at the Presidential Palace a delegation of the Croat coordination committee for Sarajevo, composed of the committee's chairman Tvrtko Nevjestic, the Provincial of the Franciscan province of Bosna Srebrena, Petar Andjelovic, the president of the Croatian cultural society Napredak [progress], Franjo Topic, and the president of the Croatian Peasants' Party [HSS] for Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ivo Komsic, the president's office announced this evening.

The delegation informed the president of the Republic about the activities of the coordination committee and the situation in Sarajevo where some 30,000 Croats were living under very difficult conditions, but where many Croat institutions were still functioning. They paid tribute Croatia's policies that were evidently aimed at the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina as a union of republics, but asked whether this was still possible.

The delegation expressed its resolve to strive toward an end to the war and the establishment of peace and cooperation between the Muslims and the Croats in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

Tudjman said that Croatia's policy had from the very beginning been based on the realization that the preservation of Bosnia-Herzegovina could only be possible if it sets itself up as a complex [slozena] community of equal peoples and not as a civil, that is Muslim, state. In this way, the factor of reciprocity would guarantee national and civil rights to members of all three nations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and protect the strategic interests of the Croat people and the Croatian state.

Thanks to the Croats, the greater Serbian aggressor did not succeed in occupying Bosnia-Herzegovina, and they did everything for the establishment of friendship and cooperation with the Muslims—even after the conflict broke out.

President Tudjman emphasized Croatia's strategic orientation towards a peaceful solution to all conflicts and pointed to the peace agreements signed in Geneva since 14 September. He stressed that the Muslim leadership was insisting on the war option, and called on all leaders to use their leverage for establishing peace and, by doing this, to bring an end to the suffering of the Croatian people in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The talks were also attended by the President's home policy advisor, Ivic Pasalic, the office of the president of the Republic of Croatia announced this evening.

Granic Urges Free Passage for UN Convoys

LD1412180693 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Text] In reaction to reports that a convoy carrying humanitarian aid for the hospital in Nova Bila will not be able to pass through the 50 km-long Muslim-controlled section of the road between Rama and Nova Bila because of objections by some local commanders in the areas under the control of the Muslim army, Dr Mate Granic, Croatian deputy prime minister and minister of foreign affairs, has sent letters to the Bosnia-Herzegovina Government President Haris Silajdzic and to UN Protection Force Commander General Jean Cot.

In his letter Dr Granic appeals to Dr Silajdzic to do his utmost in line with the Geneva agreement and their joint declaration signed in Sarajevo to ensure that both the Nova Bila and Maglaj convoys reach their destination unimpeded.

In his letter to General Cot Dr Granic draws attention to the fact that some local Muslim commanders of the Bosnia-Herzegovina army have not been implementing Prime Minister Silajdzic's and Commander Delic's orders to guarantee free passsage for humanitarian convoys, and to the fact that free passage for the convoys is of crucial importance for restoring mutual trust. He goes on to plead with General Cot and General Briquemont to do their utmost to ensure that the convoy reaches Nova Bila.

Elections Create 'Threatening Atmosphere' in Krajina

AU1512211893 Belgrade RTB Television Network in Serbo-Croatian 1800 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Report by Krste Bijelic from Knin]

[Text] Of the 28 constituent units, only eight had filed the complete and official results by 1200. That means that it is still uncertain how many voters and what percentage of the overall electoral body voted at the elections, so the election triumphs and sorrows might be premature, particularly when one keeps in mind the objections as to the regularity of the elections, which are still to be decided on by the Krajina elections commission.

Considering the conflicting information about the electoral body issued by various elections headquarters, your reporter today asked the members of the elections commission at the regular news conference whether perhaps a mechanism in the republic of Serbian Krajina existed that enabled the correct information to reach the elections headquarters of the parties and presidential candidates before it reached the commission itself. No! was the categorical answer to that. Time will then show who has created confusion in the Krajina public about the percentages, winners, and losers, and why. Whoever wins, the damage has already been done, and an atmosphere of distrust has been created, a threatening atmosphere, and your reporter was also exposed to threats.

Businesses Protest Mobilization in Opatija

AU1612094493 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Dec 93 p 7

[Report by R. Arsenic: "Instead of Working, They Have To Go to the Front]

[Excerpt] Zagreb, 13 Dec—Several hundred people from Opatija, and the neighboring villages of Lovran, Moscenicka Draga, and Matulji have been mobilized during the past few days, and it has caused real alarm among the Opatija Coast citizens. Because of such large-scale mobilization (involving reservists ranging from the young to 50 year-olds, and there were also people older than that), many enterprises in Opatija have been left without the necessary skilled workers, particularly drivers, bakers, technicians, and engineers.

Many big Opatija enterprises have protested publicly and demanded that the mayor do something regarding the Defense Ministry, because their basic functions have been threatened as a result of such large-scale mobilization, and this in fact immediately before holidays that are extremely important for tourism, such as Christmas and New Year. [passage omitted]

Army Reveals Potential to CSCE

LD1612120393 Zagreb Radio Croatia Network in Serbo-Croatian 1100 GMT 16 Dec 93

[Text] In the Vienna CSCE Headquarters the procedure was completed last night of the regular annual exchange of military information among the 52 member countries, including Croatia's participation for a second year running, Croatia's permanent mission to the CSCE has announced.

Military information was exchanged on behalf of the Croatian government by the first military adviser to the president of the republic General Anton Tus, his Deputy Brigadier General Zeljko Dobranovic, and ambassador of the Republic of Croatia to the CSCE, Darko Bekic. In addition to information relating to the organization and command structure of the Croatian Army the delegation of the Republic of Croatia yesterday also reported, within the framework of information on the number of soldiers and equipment of the Croatian army, 50,200 men in combat formations, 173 tanks, 1045 artillery pieces whose caliber exceeds 100 milimeters, 6 combat aircraft MiG-21 and 12 Mi-8 MPV helicopters, it is stated in the communique.

Article Analyzes Territorial Claims on Coast

AU1512190993 Split NEDJELJNA DALMACIJA in Serbo-Croatian 8 Dec 93 pp 3,4

[Article by Zeljko Kruselj: "Lord, Throw a 'Bone' to the Warring Factions!"]

[Text] When Croatian President Franjo Tudjman tried to convince the singer Tereza Kesovija, in an open letter to her, that she should not worry about the future of Konavli [her village near Dubrovnik], the public thought that this ended much speculation concerning the exchange of territory between the newly created countries of the former Yugoslav federation. Although Croatia, within its internationally recognized borders, would be relieved to accept that, as its south Dalmatian coast does not have a large hinterland, the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs and the Muslims have seen to it that all those combinations are back to square one again. Both Karadzic and Izetbegovic want their part of the Adriatic Sea, for, as they say, "it would be unacceptable to be so close to the coast and not have access to the sea."

"Croats Fear Isolation"

The latest meeting of the warring factions in Geneva showed that Croatia must be particularly concerned about the Muslim demands, as satisfying those demands would result in a permanent division of Croatian territory exactly at the point where it is most vulnerable. The Muslims want the area of Neum [seaside resort within borders of Bosnia-Herzegovina]—and in that they are supported by the international peace mediators, Owen and Stoltenberg—explaining that this territory belongs to Bosnia-Herzegovina anyway. Since there are 96 percent Croats in the only Bosnia-Herzegovina "maritime" municipality, in the "worst case scenario," the Muslims would accept as little as "one kilometer of the currently uninhabited part of the Neum coast," where they would probably build their port, and perhaps even a small tourist complex.

Croatia's categorical refusal to accept those demands is not so much tied to a mass expulsion of Croats from central Bosnia—although that would be reason enough in itself—but rather it primarily depends on strategic reasons. If the Muslims were to control the left bank of the Neretva, that would lead to the isolation of the Croats in eastern Herzegovina, who are in a Muslim-Serbian "sandwich" anyway. For example, they could get military help only from the area of Dubrovnik, which the international public would again interpret as "Croatia interfering in the domestic situation of Bosnia-Herzegovina." Moreover, in that case, it would be logical to expect that the Muslims and the Serbs in eastern Herzegovina would also become "natural allies," sharing territory from Capljina and Neum to Stolac and Ravni.

One does not have to be "clairvoyant," as President Tudjman keeps saying, to realize that this would directly threaten the existence, even in Croatia, of the entire belt from Peljesac to Prevlaka, including the islands of Korcula, Mljet, and Lastovo. Therefore, the Muslim demand is not just a problem of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, as was presented in Geneva, but an equally dangerous threat to the territorial integrity of the Republic of Croatia. Consequently, Tudjman's and

Boban's categorical refusal to trade over "the Neum corridor" is the only option that the Croatian negotiators can advocate.

The formal Serbian demands, on the other hand, are not as dangerous for Croatia, strategically speaking, as those made by the Muslims, but they also presuppose the exchange of territory. Naturally, this is not an attempt on behalf of the "republic of Serbian Krajina" to snatch from Croatia a part of the Ravni Kotari coast in a military assault launched from the Zadar hinterland, which the Serbian rebels are not strong enough to carry out, but rather this is Karadzic's attempt to secure access to the sea for his "Serbian republic," on the eve of an ever more imminent disintegration of the union of Bosnia-Herzegovina republics. The original plan of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs was quite similar to the present Muslim one, for in the future greater Serbian creation the Serbs envisaged the entire area east of the Neretva, and even the port of Ploce, with the center in "Serbian Dubrovnik."

"Reversal at the Geneva 'Seance'"

When the HVO [Croatian Defense Council] pushed them out of Mostar, so that ultimately, the Trebisnjica River in Popovo Polje could become a new demarcation line, along with the simultaneous withdrawal of the "Yugoslav National Army" from Prevlaka, the Serbian plan was significantly modified. Instead of the politics of the "fait accompli," they proposed that Croatia exchanged territory. According to that, the Serbs would relinquish the mountainous hinterland of Dubrovnik, while the Croats would forever give up the peninsula of Prevlaka because of "the strategic interests in Boka Kotorska." The only fault of that plan was that it included the territory of two internationally recognized countries, which presupposed the agreement of all three warring factions in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Not only could that agreement not be reached, but the Muslim demand made a bigger mess of the already complicated situation in the lower course of the Neretva.

Still, those "games with frontiers" [play on words of a television game show "Games Without frontiers"] culminated when Montenegro denied the right of the Bosnia-Herzegovina Serbs to Prevlaka, thinking that this point can only be controlled by that federal unit of the "FRY." The Montenegrins have obviously predicted that a "divorce" with Serbia could happen some day, and it would not be wise to have the Serbs from eastern Herzegovina within firing range of Boka Kotorska. Realizing that any further talks on that basis do not make much sense, by means of the letter to the inhabitants of Konavli, Tudjman warned that Croatia will not betray their interests.

However, the Geneva "seance" of last week brought a new reversal. The attempts of the international peace mediators to satisfy Izetbegovic's territorial pretensions, at least to some extent, resulted in more combinations, even more intricate than before. Having been convinced that the Republic of Croatia will not allow its territory to be divided at Neum at any cost, Owen and Stoltenberg, being two years late, have "sunk" into history even deeper, finding that Bosnia-Herzegovina, up to 1945, had another access to the Adriatic Sea, one that did not violate the territorial integrity of Croatia.

Naturally, that is Sutorina, the belt entering Boka Kotorska along the border of Croatia and Montenegro. The inhabitants of Dubrovnik sold that belt, and Neum as well, to the Turks almost three centuries ago, for that was the only way to save that mini-state from Venice, which was then the biggest maritime force in the Adriatic Sea. The Republic of Dubrovnik, helped by those Turkish "tentacles," was indeed preserved until the times of Napoleon, but after World War II, Neum and Sutorina were regarded as "historical parts of Bosnia-Herzegovina." And as commonly happened in the era of communism, the Montenegrins managed to make a deal with the Bosnia-Herzegovina political leadership to give up Sutorina, since access to Neum is "much more suitable" for Bosnia-Herzegovina. It is pointless to discuss the justness of that deal today, but it is crucial for Croatia that Sutorina and Neum have the same status for the international diplomats.

Naturally, if there are more serious discussions, Prevlaka must also be part of that same "package." If the exchange of territory is really the main prerequisite for global peace, the question of Sutorina gives a new chance for Croatia to get a better solution to that intricate problem. For, as President Tudjman said at the press conference, Croatia can give up Prevlaka, or one of its parts, provided that Neum becomes an integral part of it, with simultaneous correction of borders in the Dubrovnik hinterland. The logic of "two for one" is not exaggerated, for both Neum and Prevlaka belong to Croatia, historically and ethnically speaking, so relinquishing strategic positions at Popovo Polje would actually mean trading two Croatian areas. In other words, the winner would be the Republic of Croatia, which would provide the Adriatic hinterland, but Croats would be the losers. This principally refers to the Croats from Herzeg-Bosna, as, according to such a peace agreement, their republic would be the only one to lose access to the Adriatic coast.

Although by discussing Sutorina, Owen and Stoltenberg threw a new "bone" to the warring factions, this conception of the exchange of territories has no real chance of being implemented. The Muslims would probably agree to the "Sutorina corridor" into Boka Kotorska, but the Serbs will almost certainly not accept that, and especially not the Montenegrins. Sutorina can be reached through a wide belt of Serbian territory in eastern Herzegovina, so that agreeing to "a new dismembering of centuries-old Serbian lands" would probably lead to inter-Serbian conflicts, in which Montenegro would also be involved, claiming that "its sovereignty is being threatened."

"In Addition to Prevlaka They Also Want Molunat"

Second, but not less important, is the fact that Prevlaka, as the Serbian part of a possible deal, is also controversial. Under "certain conditions," the Croatian authorities would be prepared to give up just a part of that peninsula, while the Serbs, in addition to the entire Prevlaka, also want a part of Konavli, i.e. the belt to Molunat. If the Croatian side agrees to that demand, no matter how "difficult" it may be for Neum and the hinterland of Dubrovnik, that would create almost insoluble political problems for Tudjman, which he is probably not ready to face. Predicting the possible outcome, the Croatian president said, at the press conference, that Parliament and all the relevant state bodies will discuss every concrete proposal for exchanging territories.

Considering all this, it is certain that the exchange of territory should be more important than the agreement on free trade port zones and other ways of cooperation among the interested parties. However, as long as there is war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Muslims and the Serbs will continue to dream of their "Drang nach Adriatik" [thrust to the Adriatic Sea—last three words in German], the Croats have no alternative but to defend themselves, and diplomatic skills will not be crucial in that.

[Box, p 4]

"No Corridor Through Here"

Luka Korda, head of the municipality of Konavli:

"I do not see any reason for raising dust over the president's latest statement, thus unnecessarily disturbing the people. Both the president and Mr. Jure Radic, the president's envoy, have given us guarantees that there will be no trading with Konavli, so that, in my opinion, rumors about it can do no harm.

"We are determined not to relinquish Konavli to anyone and not to allow a corridor through Konavli, either for the Serbs or for the Muslims, and we are positive that people living here will be under neither the Serbs nor the Muslims. I would not lay particular emphasis on Prevlaka, for, if it is given to the Serbs and to the Muslims, they would certainly not use parachutes to get there, but would reach it through Konavli. Therefore, we must speak about the part of the Croatian land in the south, and giving that to anyone is out of the question.

"I think that this people have given enough and that all who want to help us should, first of all, do everything to send people who are still accommodated in hotels and refugee centers back to their homes as soon as possible, and then no one would even dream of doing what those rumors are about."

[Box, p 4]

"We Have Nothing Against That"

Ivan Bender, president of the HVO in the municipality of Neum:

"I am convinced that President Tudjman, as the president of all the Croats, together with all of us from Neum and with the leadership of the Croatian republic of Herceg-Bosna, will again find the best and most acceptable solution for the Croats. We must say that both Prevlaka and Neum belong to the Croats, and I hope that the international factors will realize that as well and accept it.

I repeat, the territory of Neum belongs to the Croats, and if we agreed to give it state sovereignty within the Croatian state, the Croats living in the municipality of Neum would have nothing against that and would accept such an offer."

Federal

Kontic: UN Sanctions Prevent Economic Recovery

LD1512194193 Belgrade TANJUG in English 1422 GMT 15 Dec 93

["Pool" item]

[Text] Bonn, Dec 15 (TANJUG)—The President of the Yugoslav Government, Radoje Kontic, assessed that, as long as the international embargo is in force, it is not possible to rectify the negative trends in the Yugoslav economy, while three fourths of factories are standing still. A constant drop in production cannot be avoided for the same reason, Kontic said in an interview published on Wednesday by the daily VESTI published in Serbian in Frankfurt.

The U.N. Security Council introduced, on May 30 1992, economic sanctions against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY), which included also an oil embargo, because of its alleged involvement in the civil and religious war in the former Yugoslav Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina. Damages are estimated at around 25 billion dollars. The power brokers of the international community have unjustly isolated and achieved a tight-proof closing down of the FRY, banning all communication with the world, Kontic said. The economic-social situation in the country is dramatic, he added, while further deterioration is imminent.

Social product per capita, in the Yugoslav Republics of Serbia and Montenegro, was 3,000 U.S. dollars in 1990. After the breaking up of the former Yugoslav Federation and the blockade, it dropped this year to 250-200 dollars.

Kontic called on Yugoslavs abroad to prepare for the period after the lifting or relaxing of sanctions and take part, with their capital and business connections, in the recovery and development of the Yugoslav economy.

Krajina Purchase of Foreign Currency Examined

AU1512131793 Belgrade POLITIKA in Serbo-Croatian 14 Dec 93 p 9

[Report by B. Dumic: "Martinovic: No Dinars From Krajina"]

[Text] Until Friday [10 December], there were no dinars on giro accounts, even to satisfy urgent needs. And then, on that day, the black market exchange rate of the German mark [DM]—the street and the banking rate—started to soar. Payments of earnings and pensions on Friday, for which little, perhaps some DM10, can be bought, are obviously not the cause of the drastic leap of the German mark.

Where did the dinars came from this weekend, when we know that there is no cash in the banks while giro accounts have been reduced to the minimum? Those well-informed in banking circles claim that the money arrived on Friday and Saturday from Krajina and rapidly raised the exchange rate of the German mark. True enough, as has been unofficially learned, a so-far unidentified state bank appeared on the foreign currency market on that day, helping bring the dinar down by purchasing German marks.

"When the money comes from Krajina, the German mark rockets as they are not buying small quantities, but up to 1 million German marks" says our source who is well-acquainted with the financial trends.

It is difficult to work out who in Krajina is purchasing great quantities of foreign currency, what is he purchasing them with, and whether there is coverage on the bank accounts or are they, as it is being rumored, often fictitious. Krajina's incursions into the Yugoslav payment operations' system have so far been mentioned only indirectly.

The Service for Payment Operations and Financial Control of Yugoslavia is responsible for the control of the payment operations in the country. When asked whether the dinars from Krajina are breaking into the payment operations, Zarija Martinovic, the first man of this service, replied briefly and categorically:

"There are absolutely no incursions into the Yugoslav payment operations."

However, since the exchange rate of the German mark is growing by the minute, it would be good if the payment operations' service examined, as quickly as possible, whether and how much money has been transferred from the other side of Drina River. Especially, if it proves that in this way individuals are growing rich via fictitious accounts without any money while everybody's standard of living is descending to an intolerable level.

Serbia

Sanctions Threatening Survival of Oil Industry

AU1412165393 Belgrade Radio Beograd Network in Serbo-Croatian 1400 GMT 14 Dec 93

[Report by Marinela Raznatovic]

[Excerpt] [passage omitted] The oil industry was one of the first branches of industry to be hit by the sanctions. We could even say that this happened before the sanctions were officially imposed, or to be more precise, in September 1991 when the oil pipeline was closed. From 1991 to 1993 the oil supply changed completely. For example, in 1991 we imported 3.1 million tonnes [of oil], but in 1993 not a single tonne was imported. Having this in mind, the general manager of the Serbian Oil Industry assessed this year's business as being relatively successful when it comes to supply, but he assesses the economic, financial results as draining. For example, in the case of the Pancevo refinery, instead of refining 11,000 to 13,000 tonnes per day, the refinery processes 2,000 to

2,500 tonnes per day. Therefore, concludes general manager Djakovic, if the sanctions stay in place, the economic survival of the Serbian Oil Industry will come into question. [passage omitted]

Article Views Army's Role in Election

AU1512161593 Belgrade NIN in Serbo-Croatian 3 Dec 93 pp 21-22

[Article by Radovan Pavlovic: "Tightening of the Belt"]

[Text] Several days after Zoran Arandjelovic publicly announced that we would be able to elect and be elected on St. Nicholas Day [19 December], an embargo was imposed on the Yugoslav Army: There is no political engagement of officers until the ballot boxes are closed.

Since the election campaign is very vigorous, Major General Momcilo Perisic, chief of the General Staff, gave the order according to which any public presentation on behalf of the Yugoslav Army is prohibited, since any statement given by an officer could be interpreted as that of the army.

The officers are, naturally, allowed to appear in public, but every public activity has to be approved of by the chief of the General Staff. Apart from that, army members will only be allowed to talk about military issues. Does this mean that "the belts" will not march onto the political scene of this hot December, staying in the barracks, or does this mean that the military ace will be used in the finale of the election campaign, as was the case in earlier elections?

"Mika Sprajc"

Since the introduction of the multiparty system, the belts have, in decisive moments, very often marched from the barracks onto the political scene. In the first multiparty election, held during the time that Yugoslavia still existed, the Yugoslav People's Army members in Croatia received the instruction "from above" to elect Ivica Racan's party [former communists].

In the first multiparty election in Serbia, there were no such instructions, but [former SFRY Defense Secretary] Veljko Kadijevic seriously warned the nationalist parties before the December election.

At that time, most of the Yugoslav People's Army officers became members of the League of Communists-The Movement for Yugoslavia (SK-PJ), a party that was named "the party of belts" because of the structure of its members. The members of "the Topcider Party" (it was founded in Topcider) became people who were ordered to enter it, so that it soon really became a mass movement rather than a party. The SK-PJ was powerful, a fact proven later on on battlefields and during the trial against the participants in the so-called "Opera" scandal. The SK-PJ members were organized according to the military principle and were, therefore, also active on the Croatian fronts, in supplying the people with weapons, for example, or in bringing weapons to Serbia. They also organized a large-scale production and distribution of leaflets. Their main objective was to preserve the Socialist Federative Republic of Yugoslavia. The fact that very soon the order was given to collectively leave this military party is a confirmation of the old comparison between politics and a fireplace: "If you come too close to it, you could burn yourself; if you stay too far away, you could freeze."

Milan Panic, the then prime and defense minister, was dealt a serious blow by a group of General Staff officers who disassociated themselves from his political engagement. This incident was partially sorted out, but Panic received a real political knockout from General Bozidar Stevanovic, the then Air Force and Air Defense commander. The famous "Mika Sprajc" addressed the public on the day of silence before the election, showing his disgust with Panic's offer to become defense minister. As always, Stevanovic used unpleasant words, which made him "famous" during his election activities in which he propagated patriotic theses (in other words, he agitated for the Socialist Party of Serbia and the Serbian Radical Party). At the same time, he accused the whole opposition of serving as foreign hirelings and traitors.

General Stevanovic is a good example of the officer who was simply thrown away by the Socialist Party—this is, to say by Milosevic, after he had used him. Supported by some officers—Zivota Panic in the first place—Stevanovic played the key role in deposing Dobrica Cosic and hoped to achieve the position of the chief of General Staff.

No Poll

Not only officers participated in political and election intrigues. At the same time, politicians tried to influence the military circles. The speech by Borisav Jovic, who in an election meeting threatened "the forces of darkness and chaos" with the fact that the Socialist Party was supported by the Yugoslav Army, will be remembered for a long time.

How will the military population behave this December? Will their members stay at the same distance to all political parties, as this is claimed in the Yugoslav Army?

It was usually considered that young officers support Vuk Draskovic and high-ranking Slobodan Milosevic. It is difficult to say whether the relation of the powers is still the same (if it existed at all), since no polls were conducted in the army. (A Belgrade agency wanted to conduct a poll recently, but it did not get the job because the sum it required was too high for the military leadership).

"The majority of the military electorate will not at all vote this time. Not because the army was not informed or did not want to participate in the creation of its destiny, but because most of the officers consider politics

a dirty job. They simply do not see the right power that could pull us out of mud," one of the General Staff colonels said for NIN.

There are rumors circulating among military circles that the Socialist Party is also counting on the army's support this year. It is believed that higher officers who want to retain their positions and all the benefits that go with them will support the SPS. There are enough officers among them who think that the past was better, so it is estimated that this layer will vote to preserve the present system, since they do not want any changes that could affect their status.

"The SPS is wrong if it is counting on support from the military circles because the situation in the army is very bad," the colonel told us. He explained to us that the ruling party was to be made responsible for the deterioration of the respect the Yugoslav Army used to have. None of the ruling party members disassociated himself from accusations of the army. The other important factor is money. Everyone knows that the army not only does not have enough money for salaries; it does not have enough money for ammunition either. No one can even dream about acquiring new weapons, in contrast to the police, who are modernizing their equipment.

Eggs

There have been serious incidents between the police and the army. Arrogant policemen often stop military cars and search them. There have even been cases where officers were beaten by policemen.

The SPS had the army's support for some time, especially as long as the SPS showed resistance to the pressure exerted by Seselj to dismiss certain officers. It was soon proven, however, that this was not the result of the SPS consistent attitude, but because the split with the Radical Party was already in sight. As far as the Radical Party leader is concerned, it does not have to be mentioned that he used to be very popular in the army. The powerful SPS campaign against Seselj and his previous role of an inquisitor caused Seselj's downfall in the army.

The sympathies for him should have gone to Zeljko Raznjatovic. In spite of the fervent supporting campaign, the atmosphere in the army shows that Arkan is politically dead for it. The army is said to be vengeful and thus cannot forget Arkan's statement made in parliament that "the army has no guts." It is considered in the army that Arkan attributed many successful actions of the Yugoslav People's Army to himself, making himself famous owing to the blood of young soldiers. "We liberated a village and after us came Arkan's people and did the cleansing. After that, they boasted that they occupied the enemy's positions," a captain from the Air Force and Air Defense said.

Draskovic does not have much support in the army, not only because of the fervent SPS campaign but also because of his confuse attitudes. "He claims one thing today and talks about a partition of Yugoslavia tomorrow. Where should the army withdraw to? To Ada Ciganlija [island in the Danube] perhaps?" a colonel from the General Staff asked, adding that soldiers like strong politicians with clearly defined programs.

As long as the respect of many parties is falling, it is estimated that respect for the Democratic Party is rising because of its moderate policies and its balancing between the leftist and rightist parties. The officers say that democrats have never been incorrect toward the army. It is remembered that the leader of the Democratic Party defended the army in parliament when it was attacked by Seselj, Arkan, or even Radmilo Bogdanovic and other SPS members.

Several days ago, when this text was written, the officers received eggs—from Karadjordjevo, at the price of 150.000 dinar per piece, whereas an egg costs 1 million dinars at the free market.

Macedonia

Ministry Denies Reports on Talks With Greeks

AU1512173193 Skopje MIC in English 15 Dec 93

[Unattributed report: "Greek-Macedonian Meeting in Washington Denied"]

[Text] The Macedonian Foreign Ministry denied the information which appeared in the Greek press that Macedonia's Foreign Minister Stevo Crvenkovski and the Greek Deputy Foreign Minister Georgious Papandreu had met in Washington. The announcement says that such a meeting was neither planned nor ever took place.

Halili Denounces New PDP Leaders as 'Stooges'

AU1512144893 Skopje NOVA MAKEDONIJA in Macedonian 15 Dec 93 p 4

[Unattributed report: "Obedience and Servility to the Patron"]

[Text] "The visit of the group of stooges to Albania, elected at the so-called 'historic PDP [Party of Democratic Prosperity] assembly' in Gostivar and self-appointed as the 'temporary PDP leadership' was an attempt to confer legitimacy on an illegal and anti-constitutional act. It reinforces the authoritarian and police-like behavior of Messrs. Selami and Spahia in the Albanian political leadership."

This was stated by the coordinator of the PDP delegate group [Nevzat Halili] in his statement for NOVA MAKEDONIJA on the occasion of the visit by the "illegitimate PDP group" to Tirana two days ago and its reception by the hosts, the leaders of the ruling Democratic Party of Albania.

Halili also emphasized that the PDP has got its own leadership (the organizing committee for the early congress) and that every other form of political organization was illegitimate and unacceptable. Moreover, he pointed out, the majority of the sub-branches of the Tetovo branch did not recognize this "group of stooges" as legitimate, but they supported the stances of the delegate group. "I consider that arms smuggling can be a form of terrorism, but certainly the worst act of terrorism is the attempt to carry out a putsch within the ranks of the PDP—to attempt to introduce a rift within a whole population, this time the Albanian one," Halili pointed out.

To conclude, Halili emphasized that the delegate group considered this visit as an act of subjection and servility on the part of a servant to his master.

Montenegro

Foreign Minister Sends Message to European Union

LD1612040693 Belgrade TANJUG in English 0031 GMT 16 Dec 93

[Text] Podgorica, Yugoslavia, Dec 15 (TANJUG) - Montenegrin Foreign Minister Miodrag Lekic has written to the foreign ministers of the European Union [EU] nations, informing them about the dramatic economic and social position of Montenegro and hoping they would accede to Montenegro's demand for urgent relief aid.

Montenegro, together with Serbia, forms the new Yugoslavia, which has been created after the violent secession of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Macedonia and Slovenia from the original six-republic federation, which triggered civil war in the lands of former Yugoslavia. Montenegro's current plight is due to draconic economic and political sanctions clamped by the U.N. Security Council on the new Yugoslavia for its alleged role in the war.

Minister Lekic reminded his E.U. counter-parts of the world's recognition of Montenegro's efforts for the restoration of peace in former Yugoslavia, it was announced on Wednesday.

Some time ago, Montenegro has applied to the U.N. sanctions committee for permission to export aluminium and use the proceeds to pay for the necessary imports of food and medicine for its population of 700,000.

Kosovo

Nine Buses Full of Policemen Leave for Belgrade

AU1612081693 Tirana TVSH Television Network in Albanian 1900 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] The Kosova Information Center reports that yesterday, six buses full of Serbian policemen left Prishtina for Belgrade. Meanwhile, at least three other buses left for Serbia today. It is presumed that these policemen have been sent to Belgrade because a meeting by the Serbian opposition slated to be held there on the eve of the early parliamentary elections. It is also supposed that everywhere from Kosovan territory to Serbia, the Serbian occupying regime has sent other police units taken from various centers of Kosova.

Police Reportedly Evicting Albanians From Homes

AU1512204593 Tirana Radio Tirana Network in Albanian 1830 GMT 15 Dec 93

[Text] The Kosova Information Center reports that the Serbian police in Mitrovice have recently undertaken a campaign to evict Albanians from their homes and settle Serbian citizens instead. During Monday alone, three Albanian families were evicted in this city and substituted by Serbian policemen. Serbian police units in Prishtina have recently used force to evict the pupils of Asim Vokshi Elementary School from their classrooms. They also arrested the head of Shtjefen Gjecovi High School. Reports confirm that the Serbian police have recently intervened four successive times to stop Albanian lessons in this school.

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